diff --git a/app/plugins/contactRetry.go b/app/plugins/contactRetry.go
index be6e6b3..249c3dd 100644
--- a/app/plugins/contactRetry.go
+++ b/app/plugins/contactRetry.go
@@ -121,9 +121,9 @@ type contactRetry struct {
 	lastCheck      time.Time
 	acnProgress    int
 
-	connections   sync.Map //[string]*contact
-	pendingQueue  *connectionQueue
-	priorityQueue *connectionQueue
+	connections     sync.Map //[string]*contact
+	pendingQueue    *connectionQueue
+	priorityQueue   *connectionQueue
 	authorizedPeers sync.Map
 }
 
@@ -232,14 +232,14 @@ func (cr *contactRetry) run() {
 				state := connections.ConnectionStateToType()[e.Data[event.ConnectionState]]
 				peer := e.Data[event.RemotePeer]
 				// only handle state change events from pre-authorized peers;
-				if _,exists := cr.authorizedPeers.Load(peer); exists {
+				if _, exists := cr.authorizedPeers.Load(peer); exists {
 					cr.handleEvent(peer, state, peerConn)
 				}
 			case event.ServerStateChange:
 				state := connections.ConnectionStateToType()[e.Data[event.ConnectionState]]
 				server := e.Data[event.GroupServer]
 				// only handle state change events from pre-authorized servers;
-				if _,exists := cr.authorizedPeers.Load(server); exists {
+				if _, exists := cr.authorizedPeers.Load(server); exists {
 					cr.handleEvent(server, state, serverConn)
 				}
 			case event.QueueJoinServer:
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ func (cr *contactRetry) handleEvent(id string, state connections.ConnectionState
 
 	// reject events that contain invalid hostnames...we cannot connect to them
 	// and they could result in spurious connection attempts...
-	if tor.IsValidHostname(id) == false {
+	if !tor.IsValidHostname(id) {
 		return
 	}