Add comment about niwl RE: ofcp

src/open-questions.md

@@ -8,20 +8,26 @@ as well as find new problems.
 
 Here are the problems we know about:
 
-* **The User Experience of Metadata Resistance Tools**: Environments that offer
+### **The User Experience of Metadata Resistance Tools**
+
+Environments that offer
  metadata resistance are plagued with issues that impact usability, e.g. 
  higher latencies than seen with centralized, metadata-driven systems, or dropped connections 
  resulting from unstable anonymization networks. Additional research is needed to understand 
  how users experience these kinds of failures, and how apps should handle and/or communicate them to users.
 
-* **Scalability**: Heavily utilized Cwtch servers increase message latency, and
+### **Scalability**
+
+Heavily utilized Cwtch servers increase message latency, and
  the resources a client requires to process messages. While Cwtch servers are 
  designed to be cheap and easy to set up, and Cwtch peers are encouraged to 
  move around, there is a clear balance to be found between increasing the 
  anonymity set of a given Cwtch server (to prevent targeted disruptions) 
  and the decentralization of Cwtch groups.
 
-* **The (Online) First Contact Problem**: Cwtch requires that any two peers are
+### **The (Online) First Contact Problem**
+
+Cwtch requires that any two peers are
   online at the same time before a key exchange/group setup is possible. 
   One potential way to overcome this is through encoding an additional public 
   key and a Cwtch server address into a Cwtch peer identifier. This would allow 
@@ -33,15 +39,22 @@ Here are the problems we know about:
   aim of disrupting new connections). However, the benefit of first contact 
   without an online key exchange is likely worth the potential DoS risk in many 
   threat models.
+  
+Note: Something like [niwl](https://git.openprivacy.ca/openprivacy/niwl) may now allow us to
+overcome this problem via fuzzy message detection and offline message retrieval.
 
-* **Reliability**: In Cwtch, servers have full control over the number of messages they store and for how long. This has
+### **Reliability**
+
+In Cwtch, servers have full control over the number of messages they store and for how long. This has
  an unfortunate impact on the reliability of group messages: if groups choose an unreliable server, they might find 
  their messages have been dropped. While we provide a mechanism for detecting dropped/missing messages, we do not
   currently provide a way to recover from such failures. There are many possible strategies from asking peers to resend 
   messages to moving to a different server, each one with benefits and drawbacks. A full evaluation of these approaches 
   should be conducted to derive a practical solution.
 
-* **Discoverability** of Servers: Much of the strength of Cwtch rests on the assumption that peers and groups can change
+### **Discoverability** of Servers
+
+Much of the strength of Cwtch rests on the assumption that peers and groups can change
  groups at any time, and that servers are untrusted and discardable. However, in this paper we have not introduced any 
  mechanism for finding new servers to use to host groups.  We believe that such an advertising mechanism could be built 
  ver Cwtch itself.