openprivacy
/
fuzzytags
3
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases Wiki Activity

Spelling and clarity fixes

This commit is contained in:
Sarah Jamie Lewis 2021-01-31 13:59:34 -08:00
parent d0c95cbc66
commit 71c3db28d6
2 changed files with 4 additions and 4 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

6
ANONYMITY.md
View File

@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ The short answer is "it depends".
The longer answer:
When different parties have different false positive rates. The server can calculate the skew between a party's ideal
When different parties have different false positive rates the server can calculate the skew between a party's ideal
false positive rate and observed false positive rate.
That skew leaks information, especially given certain message distributions. Specifically it leaks parties
who receive a larger proportion of system messages than their ideal false positive rate.
i.e. for low false positive rates and high message volume for a specific receiver, the adversarial server
can calculate a skew that leaks the receipient of individual messages - breaking privacy for that receiver.
can calculate a skew that leaks the recipient of individual messages - breaking privacy for that receiver.
It *also* removes those messages from the pool of messages that an adversarial server needs to consider for other receivers.
Effectively reducing the anonymity set for everyone else.
@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Under a certain threshold of parties, trivial breaks (i.e. tags that only match
Assuming we have large number of parties (_N_), the following heuristic emerges:
* Parties who only expect to receive a small number of messages can safely choose smaller false positive rates, up
to a threshold _θ_, where θ > 2^-N. The lower the value of _θ_ the greater the possibility of random trivial breaks for
to a threshold _θ_, where _θ > 2^-N_. The lower the value of _θ_ the greater the possibility of random trivial breaks for
the party.
* Parties who expect a large number of messages should choose to receive **all** messages for 2 reasons:
1) Even high false positive rates for power users result in information leaks to the server (due to the large

2
Cargo.toml
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
[package]
name = "fuzzytags"
description = "a probabilistic cryptographic structure for metadata resistant tagging"
version = "0.1.2"
version = "0.1.3"
repository = "https://git.openprivacy.ca/openprivacy/fuzzytags"
authors = ["Sarah Jamie Lewis <sarah@openprivacy.ca>"]
edition = "2018"