From 4f1e7b3b4ece268129ef45afa0e88bc5ac1d91a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sarah Jamie Lewis Date: Thu, 12 Jul 2018 09:16:45 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] Grammar --- content/privacy-and-p2p-protocols.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/content/privacy-and-p2p-protocols.md b/content/privacy-and-p2p-protocols.md index f4ebd4b5..1b92abc4 100644 --- a/content/privacy-and-p2p-protocols.md +++ b/content/privacy-and-p2p-protocols.md @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ And thus, many P2P systems state that this constraint makes privacy hard. The re Of course we know that Freenet presented solutions that provided pretty strong guarantees for reader anonymity and publisher anonymity nearly 2 decades ago. We've known that we can do private source discovery in P2P networks for literal decades. -Further,We now have networks like Tor and i2p which present really neat peer addressing solutions that anonymize IP endpoints and protect publishers and readers almost out of the box. (with [some caveats](https://onionscan.org)) +Further, we now have networks like Tor and i2p which present really neat peer addressing solutions that anonymize IP endpoints and protect publishers and readers almost out of the box. (with [some caveats](https://onionscan.org)) We *know* that metadata analysis is *the* thing that drives mass surveillance systems. Why in 2018 are we building new P2P networks that don't offer any reasonable privacy guarantees against mass surveillance capable adversaries?!