Merge branch 'maint-0.2.4' into release-0.2.4

This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2017-02-07 08:40:00 -05:00
commit 040d7cecf3
6 changed files with 44 additions and 4 deletions

4
changes/bug15823 Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
o Minor bugfixes (hidden service):
- Fix an out-of-bounds read when parsing invalid INTRODUCE2 cells
on a client authorized hidden service. Fixes bug 15823; bugfix
on 0.2.1.6-alpha.

6
changes/bug17404 Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
o Major bugfixes (security, correctness):
- Fix a programming error that could cause us to read 4 bytes before
the beginning of an openssl string. This could be used to provoke
a crash on systems with an unusual malloc implementation, or
systems with unsual hardening installed. Fixes bug 17404; bugfix
on 0.2.3.6-alpha.

6
changes/bug18089 Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
o Minor fixes (security):
- Make memwipe() do nothing when passed a NULL pointer
or zero size. Check size argument to memwipe() for underflow.
Closes bug #18089. Reported by "gk", patch by "teor".
Bugfix on 0.2.3.25 and 0.2.4.6-alpha (#7352),
commit 49dd5ef3 on 7 Nov 2012.

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@ -2972,6 +2972,7 @@ secret_to_key(char *key_out, size_t key_out_len, const char *secret,
/**
* Destroy the <b>sz</b> bytes of data stored at <b>mem</b>, setting them to
* the value <b>byte</b>.
* If <b>mem</b> is NULL or <b>sz</b> is zero, nothing happens.
*
* This function is preferable to memset, since many compilers will happily
* optimize out memset() when they can convince themselves that the data being
@ -2989,6 +2990,15 @@ secret_to_key(char *key_out, size_t key_out_len, const char *secret,
void
memwipe(void *mem, uint8_t byte, size_t sz)
{
if (sz == 0) {
return;
}
/* If sz is nonzero, then mem must not be NULL. */
tor_assert(mem != NULL);
/* Data this large is likely to be an underflow. */
tor_assert(sz < SIZE_T_CEILING);
/* Because whole-program-optimization exists, we may not be able to just
* have this function call "memset". A smart compiler could inline it, then
* eliminate dead memsets, and declare itself to be clever. */

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@ -2676,6 +2676,10 @@ dn_indicates_v3_cert(X509_NAME *name)
len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&s, str);
if (len < 0)
return 0;
if (len < 4) {
OPENSSL_free(s);
return 1;
}
r = fast_memneq(s + len - 4, ".net", 4);
OPENSSL_free(s);
return r;

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@ -939,11 +939,13 @@ rend_service_requires_uptime(rend_service_t *service)
return 0;
}
/** Check client authorization of a given <b>descriptor_cookie</b> for
* <b>service</b>. Return 1 for success and 0 for failure. */
/** Check client authorization of a given <b>descriptor_cookie</b> of
* length <b>cookie_len</b> for <b>service</b>. Return 1 for success
* and 0 for failure. */
static int
rend_check_authorization(rend_service_t *service,
const char *descriptor_cookie)
const char *descriptor_cookie,
size_t cookie_len)
{
rend_authorized_client_t *auth_client = NULL;
tor_assert(service);
@ -954,6 +956,13 @@ rend_check_authorization(rend_service_t *service,
return 0;
}
if (cookie_len != REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Descriptor cookie is %lu bytes, but we expected "
"%lu bytes. Dropping cell.",
(unsigned long)cookie_len, (unsigned long)REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
return 0;
}
/* Look up client authorization by descriptor cookie. */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->clients, rend_authorized_client_t *, client, {
if (tor_memeq(client->descriptor_cookie, descriptor_cookie,
@ -1300,7 +1309,8 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
if (service->clients) {
if (parsed_req->version == 3 && parsed_req->u.v3.auth_len > 0) {
if (rend_check_authorization(service,
(const char*)parsed_req->u.v3.auth_data)) {
(const char*)parsed_req->u.v3.auth_data,
parsed_req->u.v3.auth_len)) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Authorization data in INTRODUCE2 cell are valid.");
} else {
log_info(LD_REND, "The authorization data that are contained in "