Fix some leaks/missed checks in the unit tests

Coverity spotted these.
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2014-03-13 10:07:10 -04:00
parent a522e9492b
commit 119896cd43
4 changed files with 35 additions and 29 deletions

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@ -1,9 +1,19 @@
Changes in version 0.2.5.3-alpha - 2014-03-??
o Major features:
o Major features (security, DoS-resistance):
- Also consider stream buffer sizes when calculating OOM
conditions. Rename MaxMemInCellQueues to MaxMemInQueues. Fixes
bug 10169.
- Avoid hash-flooding denial-of-service attacks by using the secure
SipHash-2-4 hash function for our hashtables. Without this
feature, an attacker could degrade performance of a targeted
client or server by flooding their data structures with a large
number of data entries all calculated to be stored at the same
hash table position, thereby degrading hash table
performance. With this feature, hash table positions are derived
from a randomized cryptographic key using SipHash-2-4, and an
attacker cannot predict which entries will collide.
Closes ticket 4900.
o Minor features:
- Bridges write the SHA1 digest of their identity key fingerprint to
@ -23,16 +33,6 @@ Changes in version 0.2.5.3-alpha - 2014-03-??
database.
- Decrease the lower limit of MaxMemInQueues to 256 MBytes, to
appease raspberry pi users. Fixes bug 9686.
- Avoid hash-flooding denial-of-service attacks by using the secure
SipHash-2-4 hash function for our hashtables. Without this
feature, an attacker could degrade performance of a targeted
client or server by flooding their data structures with a large
number of data entries all calculated to be stored at the same
hash table position, thereby degrading hash table
performance. With this feature, hash table positions are derived
from a randomized cryptographic key using SipHash-2-4, and an
attacker cannot predict which entries will collide.
Closes ticket 4900.
- Made PREDICTED_CIRCS_RELEVANCE_TIME configurable from config
file with a new option, PredictedPortsRelevanceTime. Implements
ticket #9176. Patch by unixninja92.

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@ -1326,7 +1326,7 @@ sigsys_debugging(int nr, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context)
if (!ctx)
return;
syscall = ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_SYSCALL];
syscall = (int) ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_SYSCALL];
format_dec_number_sigsafe(syscall, number, sizeof(number));
tor_log_err_sigsafe("(Sandbox) Caught a bad syscall attempt (syscall ",

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@ -671,6 +671,7 @@ test_policies(void)
config_line_t line;
smartlist_t *sm = NULL;
char *policy_str = NULL;
short_policy_t *short_parsed = NULL;
policy = smartlist_new();
@ -858,24 +859,28 @@ test_policies(void)
test_short_policy_parse("reject ,1-10,,,,30-40", "reject 1-10,30-40");
/* Try parsing various broken short policies */
tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 200-199"));
tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy(""));
tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("rejekt 1,2,3"));
tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("reject "));
tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("reject"));
tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("rej"));
tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 2,3,100000"));
tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 2,3x,4"));
tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 2,3x,4"));
tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 2-"));
tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 2-x"));
tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 1-,3"));
tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 1-,3"));
#define TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY(s) \
do { \
tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, (short_parsed = parse_short_policy((s)))); \
} while (0)
TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 200-199");
TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("");
TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("rejekt 1,2,3");
TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("reject ");
TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("reject");
TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("rej");
TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 2,3,100000");
TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 2,3x,4");
TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 2,3x,4");
TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 2-");
TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 2-x");
TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 1-,3");
TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 1-,3");
/* Test a too-long policy. */
{
int i;
char *policy = NULL;
short_policy_t *parsed;
smartlist_t *chunks = smartlist_new();
smartlist_add(chunks, tor_strdup("accept "));
for (i=1; i<10000; ++i)
@ -884,9 +889,9 @@ test_policies(void)
policy = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, ch, tor_free(ch));
smartlist_free(chunks);
parsed = parse_short_policy(policy);/* shouldn't be accepted */
short_parsed = parse_short_policy(policy);/* shouldn't be accepted */
tor_free(policy);
tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parsed);
tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, short_parsed);
}
/* truncation ports */
@ -927,6 +932,7 @@ test_policies(void)
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sm, char *, s, tor_free(s));
smartlist_free(sm);
}
short_policy_free(short_parsed);
}
/** Test encoding and parsing of rendezvous service descriptors. */

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@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ test_routerkeys_write_fingerprint(void *arg)
set_server_identity_key(key);
set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_dup_key(key));
check_private_dir(ddir, CPD_CREATE, NULL);
tt_int_op(0, ==, check_private_dir(ddir, CPD_CREATE, NULL));
tt_int_op(crypto_pk_cmp_keys(get_server_identity_key(),key),==,0);
/* Write fingerprint file */