Revise the manpage to contain the actual intended *Nodes behavior

This is a squashed version of my former desired_nodes_behavior branch
that we used to specify the intended results wrt bug 1090.
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2011-03-10 18:25:51 -05:00
parent f810a1afe9
commit 2ac768e89f
1 changed files with 58 additions and 16 deletions

View File

@ -489,32 +489,74 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
**ExcludeNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address
patterns of nodes to never use when building a circuit. (Example:
ExcludeNodes SlowServer, $ EFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8)
patterns of nodes to avoid when building a circuit.
(Example:
ExcludeNodes SlowServer, $ EFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +
+
By default, this option is treated as a preference that Tor is allowed
to override in order to keep working.
For example, if you try to connect to a hidden service,
but you have excluded all of the hidden service's introduction points,
Tor will connect to one of them anyway. If you do not want this
behavior, set the StrictNodes option (documented below). +
+
Note also that if you are a relay, this (and the other node selection
options below) only affects your own circuits that Tor builds for you.
Clients can still build circuits through you to any node. Controllers
can tell Tor to build circuits through any node.
**ExcludeExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address
patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node. Note that any
patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node---that is, a
node that delivers traffic for you outside the Tor network. Note that any
node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this
list.
list too. See also the caveats on the "ExitNodes" option below
**EntryNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames and address
patterns of nodes to use for the first hop in normal circuits. These are
treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set.
**ExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address
patterns of nodes to use for the last hop in normal exit circuits. These
are treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set.
patterns of nodes to use as exit node---that is, a
node that delivers traffic for you outside the Tor network. +
+
Note that if you list too few nodes here, or if you exclude too many exit
nodes with ExcludeExitNodes, you can degrade functionality. For example,
if none of the exits you list allows traffic on port 80 or 443, you won't
be able to browse the web. +
+
Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic outside of
the Tor network. It is normal to see non-exit circuits (such as those
used to connect to hidden services, those that do directory fetches,
those used for self-tests, and so on) that end at a non-exit node. To
keep a node from being used entirely, see ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes. +
+
The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both
ExitNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. +
+
The .exit address notation, if enabled, overrides this option.
**EntryNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
A list of identity fingerprints and nicknames of nodes
to use for the first hop in your normal circuits. (Country codes and
address patterns are not yet supported.) This includes all
circuits except for direct connections to directory servers. The Bridge
option overrides this option; if you have configured bridges and
UseBridges is 1, the Bridges are used as your entry nodes. +
+
The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both
EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded.
**StrictNodes** **0**|**1**::
If 1 and EntryNodes config option is set, Tor will never use any nodes
besides those listed in EntryNodes for the first hop of a normal circuit.
If 1 and ExitNodes config option is set, Tor will never use any nodes
besides those listed in ExitNodes for the last hop of a normal exit
circuit. Note that Tor might still use these nodes for non-exit circuits
such as one-hop directory fetches or hidden service support circuits.
If StrictNodes is set to 1, Tor will treat the ExcludeNodes option as a
requirement to follow for all the circuits you generate, even if doing so
will break functionality for you. If StrictNodes is set to 0, Tor will
still try to avoid nodes in the ExcludeNodes list, but it will err on the
side of avoiding unexpected errors. Specifically, StrictNodes 0 tells
Tor that it is okay to use an excluded node when it is *necessary* to
perform self-tests, connect to
a hidden service, provide a hidden service to a client, fulfill a .exit
request, upload directory information, or download directory information.
(Default: 0)
**FascistFirewall** **0**|**1**::
If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports