fold in recent changes entries
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ChangeLog
104
ChangeLog
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@ -1,9 +1,86 @@
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Changes in version 0.2.2.25-alpha - 2011-04-??
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Changes in version 0.2.2.25-alpha - 2011-04-28
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o Major bugfixes:
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- When writing our maximum bw for the current interval to the state
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file, don't wrongly inflate that value by a factor of 10 anymore.
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Also, resume reading bandwidth history from the state file correctly.
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Fixes bug 2704; bugfix on tor-0.2.2.23-alpha.
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o Major features:
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o Major features:
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- Export GeoIP information on usage to bridge controller even if
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- Export GeoIP information on bridge usage to controller even if
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we have not yet been running for 24 hours.
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we have not yet been running for 24 hours. Now Vidalia bridge
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operators can get more accurate and immediate feedback about their
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contributions to the network.
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o Major features and bugfixes (node selection):
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- Revise and unify the meaning of the ExitNodes, EntryNodes,
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ExcludeEntryNodes, ExcludeExitNodes, ExcludeNodes, and StrictNodes
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options. Previously, we had been ambiguous in describing what
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counted as an "exit" node, and what operations exactly "StrictNodes
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0" would permit. This created confusion when people saw nodes
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built through unexpected circuits, and made it hard to tell real
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bugs from surprises. Now the intended behavior is:
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. "Exit", in the context of ExitNodes and ExcludeExitNodes,
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means a node that delivers user traffic outside the Tor network.
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. "Entry", in the context of EntryNodes, means a node used as
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the first hop of a multihop circuit. It doesn't include direct
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connections to directory servers.
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. "ExcludeNodes" applies to all nodes.
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. "StrictNodes" changes the behavior of ExcludeNodes only. When
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StrictNodes is set, Tor should avoid all nodes listed in
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ExcludeNodes, even when it will make user requests fail. When
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StrictNodes is *not* set, then Tor should follow ExcludeNodes
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whenever it can, except when it must use an excluded node
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to perform self-tests, connect to a hidden service, provide
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a hidden service, fulfill a .exit request, upload directory
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information, or fetch directory information.
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Collectively, the changes to implement the behavior fix bug 1090.
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- ExcludeNodes now takes precedence over EntryNodes and ExitNodes:
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if a node is listed in both, it's treated as excluded.
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- ExcludeNodes now applies to directory nodes -- as a preference if
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StrictNodes is 0, or an absolute requirement if StrictNodes is 1.
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Don't exclude all the directory authorities and set StrictNodes
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to 1 unless you really want your Tor to break.
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- ExcludeNodes and ExcludeExitNodes now override exit enclaving.
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- ExcludeExitNodes now overrides .exit requests.
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- We don't use bridges listed in ExcludeNodes.
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- When StrictNodes is 1:
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. We now apply ExcludeNodes to hidden service introduction points
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and to rendezvous points selected by hidden service users.
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This can make your hidden service less reliable: use it with
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caution!
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. If we have used ExcludeNodes on ourself, do not try relay
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reachability self-tests.
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. If we have excluded all the directory authorities, we will
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not even try to upload our descriptor if we're a relay.
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. Do not honor .exit requests to an excluded node.
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- Remove a misfeature that caused us to ignore the Fast/Stable flags
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when ExitNodes is set. Bugfix on 0.2.2.7-alpha.
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- When the set of permitted nodes changes, we now remove any
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mappings introduced via TrackExitHosts to now-excluded nodes.
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Bugfix on 0.1.0.1-rc.
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- We never cannibalize a circuit that had excluded nodes on it,
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even if StrictNodes is 0. Bugfix on 0.1.0.1-rc.
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- Revert a change where we would be laxer about attaching streams to
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circuits than when building the circuits. This was meant to
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prevent a set of bugs where streams were never attachable, but our
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improved code here should make this unnecessary. Bugfix on
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0.2.2.7-alpha.
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- Keep track of how many times we launch a new circuit to handle
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a given stream. Too many launches could indicate an inconsistency
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between our "launch a circuit to handle this stream" logic and our
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"attach this stream to one of the available circuits" logic.
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- Improve log messages related to excluded nodes.
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o Minor bugfixes:
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o Minor bugfixes:
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- Added a forgotten cast that caused a compile warning on OS X 10.6.
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Bugfix on 0.2.2.24-alpha.
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- If the Nickname configuration option isn't given, Tor would pick
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a nickname based on the local hostname as the nickname for a relay.
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Because nicknames are not very important in today's Tor and the
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"Unnamed" nickname has been implemented, this is now problematic
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behavior: It leaks information about the hostname without being
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useful at all. Bugfix on 0.1.2.2-alpha, which introduced the
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Unnamed nickname. Fixes bug 2979, reported by tagnaq.
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- Be more careful about reporting the correct error from a failed
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- Be more careful about reporting the correct error from a failed
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connect() system call. Under some circumstances, it was possible to
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connect() system call. Under some circumstances, it was possible to
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look at an incorrect value for errno when sending the end reason.
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look at an incorrect value for errno when sending the end reason.
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@ -13,9 +90,24 @@ Changes in version 0.2.2.25-alpha - 2011-04-??
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connection in single second. Bugfix on 0.1.2.8-beta.
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connection in single second. Bugfix on 0.1.2.8-beta.
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- When a client finds that an origin circuit has run out of 16-bit
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- When a client finds that an origin circuit has run out of 16-bit
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stream IDs, we now mark it as unusable for new streams. Previously,
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stream IDs, we now mark it as unusable for new streams. Previously,
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we would try to close the entire circuit. Bugfix on Tor 0.0.6.
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we would try to close the entire circuit. Bugfix on 0.0.6.
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- Added a forgotten cast that caused a compile warning on OS X
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- Correct the warning displayed when a rendezvous descriptor exceeds
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10.6. Bugfix on 0.2.2.24-alpha.
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the maximum size. Fixes bug 2750; bugfix on 0.2.1.5-alpha. Found
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by John Brooks.
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- Downgrade "no current certificates known for authority" message from
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Notice to Info. Fixes bug 2899; bugfix on 0.2.0.10-alpha.
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- Make the SIGNAL DUMP control-port command work on FreeBSD. Fixes
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bug 2917. Bugfix on 0.1.1.1-alpha.
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- Fix an uncommon assertion failure when running with DNSPort under
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heavy load. Fixes bug 2933; bugfix on 2.0.1-alpha.
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- Only limit the lengths of single HS descriptors, even when
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multiple HS descriptors are published to an HSDir relay in a
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single POST operation. Fixes bug 2948; bugfix on 0.2.1.5-alpha.
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Found by hsdir.
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- Be more consistent in our treatment of file system paths. "~" should
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get expanded to the user's home directory in the Log config option.
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Fixes bug 2971; bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha, which introduced the
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feature for the -f and --DataDirectory options.
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o Minor features:
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o Minor features:
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- Send END_STREAM_REASON_NOROUTE in response to EHOSTUNREACH errors.
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- Send END_STREAM_REASON_NOROUTE in response to EHOSTUNREACH errors.
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@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
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o Major features and bugfixes (node selection)
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- Revise and unify the meaning of the ExitNodes, EntryNodes,
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ExcludeEntryNodes, ExcludeExitNodes, ExcludeNodes, and
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StrictNodes options. Previously, we had been ambiguous in
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describing what counted as an "exit" node, and what operations
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exactly "StrictNodes 0" would permit. This created confusion
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when people saw nodes built through unexpected circuits, and
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made it hard to tell real bugs from surprises. We now stipulate
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that the intended behavior is:
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. "Exit", in the context of ExitNodes and ExcludeExitNodes,
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means a node that delivers user traffic outside the Tor
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network.
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. "Entry", in the context of EntryNodes,
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means a node used as the first hop of a multihop circuit:
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it doesn't include direct connections to directory servers.
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. "ExcludeNodes" applies to all nodes.
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. "StrictNodes" changes the behavior of ExcludeNodes only.
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When StrictNodes is set, Tor should avoid all nodes listed
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in ExcludeNodes, even when it will make user requests
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fail. When StrictNodes is *not* set, then Tor should
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follow ExcludeNodes whenever it can, except when it must
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use an excluded node to perform self-tests, connect to a
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hidden service, provide a hidden service, fulfill a .exit
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request, upload directory information, or fetch directory
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information.
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Collectively, the changes to implement the behavior are a fix for
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bug 1090.
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- ExcludeNodes now takes precedence over EntryNodes and ExitNodes:
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if a node is listed in both, it's treated as excluded.
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- ExcludeNodes now applies to directory nodes: as a preference if
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StrictNodes is 0, or an absolute requirement if StrictNodes is 1.
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(Don't exclude all the directory authorities and set StrictNodes
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to 1 unless you really want your Tor to break.)
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- ExcludeNodes and ExcludeExitNodes now override exit enclaving.
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- ExcludeExitNodes now overrides .exit requests.
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- We don't use bridges from ExcludeNodes.
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- When StrictNodes is 1:
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. We now apply ExcludeNodes to hidden service introduction points
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and to rendezvous points selected by hidden service users.
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This can make your hidden service less reliable: use it with
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caution!
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. If we have used ExcludeNodes on ourself, do not try relay
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reachability self-tests.
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. If we have excluded all the directory authorities, we will
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not even try to upload our descriptor if we're a relay.
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. Do not honor .exit requests to an excluded node.
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- Remove a misfeature that caused us to ignore the Fast/Stable flags
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if ExitNodes was set. Bugfix on 0.2.2.7-alpha.
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- When the set of permitted nodes changes, we now remove any
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mappings introduced via TrackExitHosts to now-excluded nodes.
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Bugfix on 0.1.0.1-rc.
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- We never cannibalize a circuit that had excluded nodes on it,
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even if StrictNodes is 0. Bugfix on 0.1.0.1-rc.
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- Improve log messages related to excluded nodes.
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- Revert a change where we would be laxer about attaching streams to
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circuits than when building the circuits. This was meant to
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prevent a set of bugs where streams were never attachable, but our
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improved code here should make this unnecessary. Bugfix on
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0.2.2.7-alpha.
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@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
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o Minor features:
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- Keep track of how many times we launch a new circuit to handle
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a given stream. Too many launches could indicate an inconsistency
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between our "launch a circuit to handle this stream" logic and our
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"attach our stream to one of the available circuits" logic.
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@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
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o Major bugfixes:
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- When writing our maximum bw for the current interval to the state
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file, don't wrongly inflate that value by a factor of 10 anymore.
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Fixes more of bug 2704.
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@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
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o Minor bugfixes:
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- Fix an issue causing calculation of Tor's average bandwidth as saved
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in the state file to be 10 times smaller than it should be. Fixes the
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first part of bug 2704, bugfix on tor-0.2.2.23-alpha.
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@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
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o Major bugfixes:
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- Prevent relays that read their bandwidth history from their state file
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from arbitrarily inflating that value. Fixes the second half of bug
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2704, bugfix on tor-0.2.2.23-alpha.
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@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
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o Minor bugfixes
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- Correct the warning displayed when a rendezvous descriptor exceeds
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the maximum size. Fixes bug 2750; bugfix on 0.2.1.5-alpha. Found
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by John Brooks.
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@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
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- Minor bugfixes:
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o Downgrade "no current certificates known for authority" message from
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Notice to Info. Bugfix on 0.2.0.10-alpha; fixes bug 2899.
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@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
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o Minor bugfixes
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- Make the SIGNAL DUMP control-port command work on FreeBSD. Fixes
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bug 2917. Bugfix on 0.1.1.1-alpha.
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@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
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o Minor bugfixes
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- Fix an uncommon assertion failure when running with DNSPort under
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heavy load. Fixes bug 2933; bugfix on 2.0.1-alpha.
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@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
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o Minor bugfixes
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- Only limit the lengths of single HS descriptors, even when
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multiple HS descriptors are published to an HSDir relay in a
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single POST operation. Fixes bug 2948; bugfix on 0.2.1.5-alpha.
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Found by hsdir.
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@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
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o Minor bugfixes:
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- Be more consistent in our treatment of file system paths. ~ should
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get expanded to the user's home directory in the Log config option.
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Bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha, which introduced the feature for the -f and
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--DataDirectory options. Fixes bug 2971.
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@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
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o Minor bugfixes:
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- If the Nickname configuration option wasn't given, Tor used to pick
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a nickname based on the local hostname as the nickname for a relay.
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Because nicknames are not very important in today's Tor and the
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"Unnamed" nickname has been implemented, this is now problematic
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behaviour: It leaks information about the hostname without being
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useful at all. Bugfix on tor-0.1.2.2-alpha, which introduced the
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Unnamed nickname. Fixes bug 2979, reported by tagnaq.
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@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
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o Minor features:
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- If ExitNodes is set, still pay attention to the Fast/Stable
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status of exits when picking exit nodes. (We used to ignore
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these flags when ExitNodes was set, on the grounds that people
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who set exitnodes wanted all of those nodes to get used, but
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with the ability to pick exits by country and IP range, this
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doesn't necessarily make sense any more.)
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|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue