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Merge remote branch 'origin/maint-0.2.1'

This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2010-01-31 22:53:19 -05:00
parent 445e95b129 abd447f876
commit 5314438799
1 changed files with 34 additions and 12 deletions
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46
src/common/tortls.c
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@ -356,17 +356,39 @@ tor_tls_init(void)
SSL_load_error_strings();
version = SSLeay();
if (version >= 0x009070c0L && version < 0x00908000L) {
log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s looks like version 0.9.7l or later; "
"I will try SSL3_FLAGS and SSL3_OP to enable renegotation",
/* OpenSSL 0.9.8l introdeced SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAGE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
* here, but without thinking too hard about it: it turns out that the
* flag in question needed to be set at the last minute, and that it
* conflicted with an existing flag number that had already been added
* in the OpenSSL 1.0.0 betas. OpenSSL 0.9.8m thoughtfully replaced
* the flag with an option and (it seems) broke anything that used
* SSL3_FLAGS_* for the purpose. So we need to know how to do both,
* and we mustn't use the SSL3_FLAGS option with anything besides
* OpenSSL 0.9.8l.
*
* No, we can't just set flag 0x0010 everywhere. It breaks Tor with
* OpenSSL 1.0.0beta, since i. No, we can't just set option
* 0x00040000L everywhere: before 0.9.8m, it meant something else.
*
* No, we can't simply detect whether the flag or the option is present
* in the headers at build-time: some vendors (notably Apple) like to
* leave their headers out of sync with their libraries.
*
* Yes, it _is_ almost as if the OpenSSL developers decided that no
* program should be allowed to use renegotiation its first passed an
* test of intelligence and determination.
*/
if (version >= 0x009080c0L && version < 0x009080d0L) {
log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s looks like version 0.9.8l; "
"I will try SSL3_FLAGS to enable renegotation.",
SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag = 1;
use_unsafe_renegotiation_op = 1;
} else if (version >= 0x009080c0L) {
log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s looks like version 0.9.8l or later; "
"I will try SSL3_FLAGS and SSL_OP to enable renegotiation",
} else if (version >= 0x009080d0L) {
log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s looks like version 0.9.8m or later; "
"I will try SSL_OP to enable renegotiation",
SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag = 1;
use_unsafe_renegotiation_op = 1;
} else {
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s has version %lx",
@ -631,11 +653,6 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime)
#endif
/* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation
* as authenticating any earlier-received data.
*
* (OpenSSL 0.9.8l introdeced SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAGE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
* here. OpenSSL 0.9.8m thoughtfully turned it into an option and (it
* seems) broke anything that used SSL3_FLAGS_* for the purpose. So we need
* to do both.)
*/
if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_op) {
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
@ -943,6 +960,7 @@ tor_tls_new(int sock, int isServer)
SSL_set_info_callback(result->ssl, tor_tls_server_info_callback);
}
#endif
/* Not expected to get called. */
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "generating TLS context");
return result;
@ -991,6 +1009,10 @@ tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag) {
tls->ssl->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
}
if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_op) {
SSL_set_options(tls->ssl,
SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
}
}
/** If this version of openssl supports it, turn off renegotiation on