Merge branch 'maint-0.2.1' into release-0.2.1
This commit is contained in:
commit
6ef2e30c72
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@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
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o Security fixes:
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- Don't attach new streams to old rendezvous circuits after SIGNAL
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NEWNYM. Previously, we would keep using an existing rendezvous
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circuit if it remained open (i.e. if it were kept open by a
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long-lived stream or if a new stream were attached to it before
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Tor could notice that it was old and no longer in use and close
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it). Bugfix on 0.1.1.15-rc; fixes bug 3375.
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
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o Minor features:
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- Allow nameservers with IPv6 address. Fixes bug 2574.
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
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o Minor features:
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- Adjust the expiration time on our SSL session certificates to
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better match SSL certs seen in the wild. Resolves ticket 4014.
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@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
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o Minor bugfixes:
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- Always NUL-terminate the sun_path field of a sockaddr_un before
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passing it to the kernel. (Not a security issue: kernels are
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smart enough to reject bad sockaddr_uns.) Found by Coverity; CID
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# 428. Bugfix on Tor 0.2.0.3-alpha.
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@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
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o Minor bugfixes:
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- Don't stack-allocate the list of supplementary GIDs when we're
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about to log them. Stack-allocating NGROUPS_MAX gid_t elements
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could take up to 256K, which is way too much stack. Found by
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Coverity; CID #450. Bugfix on 0.2.1.7-alpha.
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
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o Minor features:
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- Update to the August 2 2011 Maxmind GeoLite Country database.
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
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o Minor features:
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- Update to the July 1 2011 Maxmind GeoLite Country database.
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
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o Minor features:
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- Update to the June 1 2011 Maxmind GeoLite Country database.
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
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o Minor features:
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- Update to the October 4 2011 Maxmind GeoLite Country database.
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
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o Minor features:
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- Update to the September 6 2011 Maxmind GeoLite Country database.
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@ -1080,7 +1080,8 @@ log_credential_status(void)
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/* Read, effective and saved GIDs */
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gid_t rgid, egid, sgid;
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/* Supplementary groups */
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gid_t sup_gids[NGROUPS_MAX + 1];
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gid_t *sup_gids = NULL;
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int sup_gids_size;
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/* Number of supplementary groups */
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int ngids;
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@ -1126,9 +1127,19 @@ log_credential_status(void)
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#endif
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/* log supplementary groups */
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if ((ngids = getgroups(NGROUPS_MAX + 1, sup_gids)) < 0) {
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sup_gids_size = 64;
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sup_gids = tor_malloc(sizeof(gid_t) * 64);
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while ((ngids = getgroups(sup_gids_size, sup_gids)) < 0 &&
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errno == EINVAL &&
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sup_gids_size < NGROUPS_MAX) {
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sup_gids_size *= 2;
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sup_gids = tor_realloc(sup_gids, sizeof(gid_t) * sup_gids_size);
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}
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if (ngids < 0) {
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log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Error getting supplementary GIDs: %s",
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strerror(errno));
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tor_free(sup_gids);
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return -1;
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} else {
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int i, retval = 0;
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@ -1158,6 +1169,7 @@ log_credential_status(void)
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tor_free(cp);
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});
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smartlist_free(elts);
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tor_free(sup_gids);
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return retval;
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}
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24782
src/config/geoip
24782
src/config/geoip
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
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@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ circuit_is_acceptable(circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn,
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return 0;
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}
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if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL)
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if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
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purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED)
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if (circ->timestamp_dirty &&
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circ->timestamp_dirty+get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness <= now)
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return 0;
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@ -804,7 +804,13 @@ create_unix_sockaddr(const char *listenaddress, char **readable_address,
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sockaddr = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(struct sockaddr_un));
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sockaddr->sun_family = AF_UNIX;
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strncpy(sockaddr->sun_path, listenaddress, sizeof(sockaddr->sun_path));
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if (strlcpy(sockaddr->sun_path, listenaddress, sizeof(sockaddr->sun_path))
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>= sizeof(sockaddr->sun_path)) {
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log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Unix socket path '%s' is too long to fit.",
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escaped(listenaddress));
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tor_free(sockaddr);
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return NULL;
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}
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if (readable_address)
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*readable_address = tor_strdup(listenaddress);
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@ -2320,7 +2320,7 @@ _evdns_nameserver_add_impl(const struct sockaddr *address,
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memset(ns, 0, sizeof(struct nameserver));
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ns->timeout_event_deleted = __LINE__;
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ns->socket = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
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ns->socket = socket(address->sa_family, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
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if (ns->socket < 0) { err = 1; goto out1; }
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#ifdef WIN32
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{
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@ -866,12 +866,14 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now)
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now + DESCRIPTOR_FAILURE_RESET_INTERVAL;
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}
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/** 1b. Every MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME seconds, we change our TLS context. */
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/** 1b. Every MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_INTERNAL seconds, we change our
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* TLS context. */
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if (!last_rotated_x509_certificate)
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last_rotated_x509_certificate = now;
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if (last_rotated_x509_certificate+MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME < now) {
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if (last_rotated_x509_certificate+MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_INTERNAL < now) {
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log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Rotating tls context.");
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if (tor_tls_context_new(get_identity_key(), MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME) < 0) {
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if (tor_tls_context_new(get_identity_key(),
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MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) {
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log_warn(LD_BUG, "Error reinitializing TLS context");
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/* XXX is it a bug here, that we just keep going? -RD */
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}
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/** How often do we rotate onion keys? */
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#define MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME (7*24*60*60)
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/** How often do we rotate TLS contexts? */
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#define MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME (2*60*60)
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#define MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_INTERNAL (2*60*60)
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/** What expiry time shall we place on our SSL certs? */
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#define MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED (365*24*60*60)
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/** How old do we allow a router to get before removing it
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* from the router list? In seconds. */
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@ -1077,6 +1077,7 @@ rend_cache_store(const char *desc, size_t desc_len, int published,
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log_warn(LD_REND, "Received service descriptor for service ID %s; "
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"expected descriptor for service ID %s.",
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query, safe_str(service_id));
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rend_service_descriptor_free(parsed);
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return -2;
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}
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now = time(NULL);
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@ -458,7 +458,8 @@ init_keys(void)
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}
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set_identity_key(prkey);
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/* Create a TLS context; default the client nickname to "client". */
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if (tor_tls_context_new(get_identity_key(), MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME) < 0) {
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if (tor_tls_context_new(get_identity_key(),
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MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) {
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log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error creating TLS context for Tor client.");
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return -1;
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}
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tor_free(keydir);
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/* 3. Initialize link key and TLS context. */
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if (tor_tls_context_new(get_identity_key(), MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME) < 0) {
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if (tor_tls_context_new(get_identity_key(),
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MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_ADVERTISED) < 0) {
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log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error initializing TLS context");
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return -1;
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}
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