Merge branch 'maint-0.2.1' into release-0.2.1
This commit is contained in:
Roger Dingledine
commit
75953f9b60
51
ReleaseNotes
51
ReleaseNotes
|
|
@ -3,6 +3,57 @@ This document summarizes new features and bugfixes in each stable release
|
|||
of Tor. If you want to see more detailed descriptions of the changes in
|
||||
each development snapshot, see the ChangeLog file.
|
||||
|
||||
Changes in version 0.2.1.30 - 2011-02-23
|
||||
Tor 0.2.1.30 fixes a variety of less critical bugs. The main other
|
||||
change is a slight tweak to Tor's TLS handshake that makes relays
|
||||
and bridges that run this new version reachable from Iran again.
|
||||
We don't expect this tweak will win the arms race long-term, but it
|
||||
buys us time until we roll out a better solution.
|
||||
|
||||
o Major bugfixes:
|
||||
- Stop sending a CLOCK_SKEW controller status event whenever
|
||||
we fetch directory information from a relay that has a wrong clock.
|
||||
Instead, only inform the controller when it's a trusted authority
|
||||
that claims our clock is wrong. Bugfix on 0.1.2.6-alpha; fixes
|
||||
the rest of bug 1074.
|
||||
- Fix a bounds-checking error that could allow an attacker to
|
||||
remotely crash a directory authority. Bugfix on 0.2.1.5-alpha.
|
||||
Found by "piebeer".
|
||||
- If relays set RelayBandwidthBurst but not RelayBandwidthRate,
|
||||
Tor would ignore their RelayBandwidthBurst setting,
|
||||
potentially using more bandwidth than expected. Bugfix on
|
||||
0.2.0.1-alpha. Reported by Paul Wouters. Fixes bug 2470.
|
||||
- Ignore and warn if the user mistakenly sets "PublishServerDescriptor
|
||||
hidserv" in her torrc. The 'hidserv' argument never controlled
|
||||
publication of hidden service descriptors. Bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha.
|
||||
|
||||
o Minor features:
|
||||
- Adjust our TLS Diffie-Hellman parameters to match those used by
|
||||
Apache's mod_ssl.
|
||||
- Update to the February 1 2011 Maxmind GeoLite Country database.
|
||||
|
||||
o Minor bugfixes:
|
||||
- Check for and reject overly long directory certificates and
|
||||
directory tokens before they have a chance to hit any assertions.
|
||||
Bugfix on 0.2.1.28. Found by "doorss".
|
||||
- Bring the logic that gathers routerinfos and assesses the
|
||||
acceptability of circuits into line. This prevents a Tor OP from
|
||||
getting locked in a cycle of choosing its local OR as an exit for a
|
||||
path (due to a .exit request) and then rejecting the circuit because
|
||||
its OR is not listed yet. It also prevents Tor clients from using an
|
||||
OR running in the same instance as an exit (due to a .exit request)
|
||||
if the OR does not meet the same requirements expected of an OR
|
||||
running elsewhere. Fixes bug 1859; bugfix on 0.1.0.1-rc.
|
||||
|
||||
o Packaging changes:
|
||||
- Stop shipping the Tor specs files and development proposal documents
|
||||
in the tarball. They are now in a separate git repository at
|
||||
git://git.torproject.org/torspec.git
|
||||
- Do not include Git version tags as though they are SVN tags when
|
||||
generating a tarball from inside a repository that has switched
|
||||
between branches. Bugfix on 0.2.1.15-rc; fixes bug 2402.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Changes in version 0.2.1.29 - 2011-01-15
|
||||
Tor 0.2.1.29 continues our recent code security audit work. The main
|
||||
fix resolves a remote heap overflow vulnerability that can allow remote
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
|
|||
o Major bugfixes (bridge authority)
|
||||
- Do not allow encrypte requests for "all" bridges to return all
|
||||
bridges.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
|
|||
o Minor bugfixes:
|
||||
- When we restart our relay, we might get a successful connection
|
||||
from the outside before we've started our reachability tests,
|
||||
triggering a warning: "ORPort found reachable, but I have no
|
||||
routerinfo yet. Failing to inform controller of success." This
|
||||
bug was harmless unless Tor is running under a controller
|
||||
like Vidalia, in which case the controller would never get a
|
||||
REACHABILITY_SUCCEEDED status event. Bugfix on 0.1.2.6-alpha;
|
||||
fixes bug 1172.
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
|||
o Minor bugfixes
|
||||
- Use micro-revision numbers in 0.2.1.x instead: apparently, they
|
||||
were more used than we had known. (Bugfix on 0.2.1.30).
|
||||
- Instead of generating our micro-version numbers using SVN revisions,
|
||||
use git revisions instead. Bugfix on 0.2.1.15-rc; fixes bug 2402.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
|||
o Minor bugfixes:
|
||||
- Avoid signed/unsigned comparisons by making SIZE_T_CEILING unsigned.
|
||||
(None of the cases where we did this before were wrong, but by making
|
||||
this change we can avoid warnings.) Fixes bug2475; bugfix on
|
||||
Tor 0.2.1.28.
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
|||
o Minor bugfixes
|
||||
- Fix a crash bug that could occur occasionally when a client was
|
||||
configured with a large number of bridges. Fixes bug 2629; bugfix
|
||||
on 0.2.1.2-alpha. Bugfix by trac user "shitlei".
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
|||
o Minor bugfixes
|
||||
- Correct the warning displayed when a rendezvous descriptor exceeds
|
||||
the maximum size. Fixes bug 2750; bugfix on 0.2.1.5-alpha. Found
|
||||
by John Brooks.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
|
|||
o Minor bugfixes
|
||||
- Fix an uncommon assertion failure when running with DNSPort under
|
||||
heavy load. Fixes bug 2933; bugfix on 2.0.1-alpha.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
|
|||
o Security fixes:
|
||||
- Forget all hidden service descriptors cached as a client when
|
||||
processing a SIGNAL NEWNYM command. Fixes bug 3000. Bugfix on
|
||||
0.0.6.
|
||||
o Code simplifications and refactoring:
|
||||
- Allow rend_client_send_introduction to fail without closing the
|
||||
AP connection permanently.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
|
|||
o Minor features:
|
||||
- Update to the April 1 2011 Maxmind GeoLite Country database.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
|
|||
o Minor features:
|
||||
- Update to the March 1 2011 Maxmind GeoLite Country database.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
|
|||
o Major bugfixes:
|
||||
- Fix a crash in parsing router descriptors containing IPv6
|
||||
addresses. This one crashed the directory authorities when somebody
|
||||
fired up some experimental code. Bugfix on 0.2.1.3-alpha.
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
|
|||
o Minor bugfixes
|
||||
- When warning about missing zlib development packages, give the
|
||||
correct package names. Bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha.
|
||||
|
|
@ -336,10 +336,10 @@ AC_SUBST(TOR_OPENSSL_LIBS)
|
|||
dnl ------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
dnl Where do you live, zlib? And how do we call you?
|
||||
|
||||
tor_openssl_pkg_redhat="zlib"
|
||||
tor_openssl_pkg_debian="zlib1g"
|
||||
tor_openssl_devpkg_redhat="zlib-devel"
|
||||
tor_openssl_devpkg_debian="zlib1g-dev"
|
||||
tor_zlib_pkg_redhat="zlib"
|
||||
tor_zlib_pkg_debian="zlib1g"
|
||||
tor_zlib_devpkg_redhat="zlib-devel"
|
||||
tor_zlib_devpkg_debian="zlib1g-dev"
|
||||
|
||||
TOR_SEARCH_LIBRARY(zlib, $tryzlibdir, [-lz],
|
||||
[#include <zlib.h>],
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(crypto_pk_env_t *env,
|
|||
|
||||
tor_assert(env);
|
||||
tor_assert(s);
|
||||
tor_assert(len < INT_MAX && len < SIZE_T_CEILING);
|
||||
tor_assert(len < INT_MAX && len < SSIZE_T_CEILING);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Create a read-only memory BIO, backed by the string 's' */
|
||||
b = BIO_new_mem_buf((char*)s, (int)len);
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -330,8 +330,10 @@ typedef uint32_t uintptr_t;
|
|||
#endif
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/* Any ssize_t larger than this amount is likely to be an underflow. */
|
||||
#define SSIZE_T_CEILING ((ssize_t)(SSIZE_T_MAX-16))
|
||||
/* Any size_t larger than this amount is likely to be an underflow. */
|
||||
#define SIZE_T_CEILING (SSIZE_T_MAX-16)
|
||||
#define SIZE_T_CEILING ((size_t)(SSIZE_T_MAX-16))
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* __TORINT_H */
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
13026
src/config/geoip
13026
src/config/geoip
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
|
|
@ -55,52 +55,18 @@ noinst_HEADERS = or.h eventdns.h eventdns_tor.h micro-revision.i
|
|||
tor_main.o: micro-revision.i
|
||||
|
||||
micro-revision.i: FORCE
|
||||
@svkdir=$$SVKROOT; \
|
||||
if test "x$$svkdir" = x ; then \
|
||||
svkdir=$$HOME/.svk; \
|
||||
fi; \
|
||||
if test -d ../../.git && test -x "`which git 2>&1;true`" ; then \
|
||||
if test -d ../../.git/svn && test -x "`which git-svn 2>&1;true`" ; then \
|
||||
git-svn info ../../README | \
|
||||
sed -n 's/^Revision: \([0-9][0-9]*\).*/"\1"/p' \
|
||||
> micro-revision.tmp \
|
||||
|| true; \
|
||||
fi; \
|
||||
elif test -d ../../.svn && test -x "`which svn 2>&1;true`" ; then \
|
||||
svn info ../.. | \
|
||||
sed -n 's/^Revision: \([0-9][0-9]*\).*/"\1"/p' > micro-revision.tmp \
|
||||
|| true; \
|
||||
elif test -x "`which svk 2>&1;true`" && test -d $$svkdir/local; then \
|
||||
location=../..; \
|
||||
rev=x; \
|
||||
while test x$$rev = xx; do \
|
||||
x=`svk info $$location | \
|
||||
sed -n 's/^Mirrored From:.*, Rev\. \([0-9][0-9]*\)/\1/p'`; \
|
||||
if test x$$x != x; then \
|
||||
rev=$$x; \
|
||||
break; \
|
||||
else \
|
||||
loc=`svk info $$location | \
|
||||
sed -n 's/^Copied From: \(.*\), Rev\. [0-9][0-9]*/\1/p' | \
|
||||
head -1`; \
|
||||
if test x$$loc = x; then \
|
||||
break; \
|
||||
else \
|
||||
location=/$$loc; \
|
||||
fi; \
|
||||
fi; \
|
||||
done; \
|
||||
if test x$$rev != xx; then \
|
||||
echo \"$$rev\" > micro-revision.tmp; \
|
||||
fi; \
|
||||
fi; \
|
||||
if test ! -f micro-revision.tmp ; then \
|
||||
if test ! -f micro-revision.i ; then \
|
||||
echo '""' > micro-revision.i; \
|
||||
fi; \
|
||||
elif test ! -f micro-revision.i || \
|
||||
test x"`cat micro-revision.tmp`" != x"`cat micro-revision.i`"; then \
|
||||
mv micro-revision.tmp micro-revision.i; \
|
||||
@rm -f micro-revision.tmp; \
|
||||
if test -d ../../.git && test -x "`which git 2>&1;true`"; then \
|
||||
HASH="`git rev-parse --short=16 HEAD`"; \
|
||||
echo \"$$HASH\" > micro-revision.tmp; \
|
||||
fi; \
|
||||
if test ! -f micro-revision.tmp ; then \
|
||||
if test ! -f micro-revision.i ; then \
|
||||
echo '""' > micro-revision.i; \
|
||||
fi; \
|
||||
elif test ! -f micro-revision.i || \
|
||||
test x"`cat micro-revision.tmp`" != x"`cat micro-revision.i`"; then \
|
||||
mv micro-revision.tmp micro-revision.i; \
|
||||
fi; true
|
||||
|
||||
#Dummy target to ensure that micro-revision.i _always_ gets built.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -3200,7 +3200,8 @@ any_pending_bridge_descriptor_fetches(void)
|
|||
conn->purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC &&
|
||||
TO_DIR_CONN(conn)->router_purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE &&
|
||||
!conn->marked_for_close &&
|
||||
conn->linked && !conn->linked_conn->marked_for_close) {
|
||||
conn->linked &&
|
||||
conn->linked_conn && !conn->linked_conn->marked_for_close) {
|
||||
log_debug(LD_DIR, "found one: %s", conn->address);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1560,14 +1560,21 @@ connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(edge_connection_t *conn)
|
|||
"introduction. (stream %d sec old)",
|
||||
introcirc->_base.n_circ_id, rendcirc->_base.n_circ_id,
|
||||
conn_age);
|
||||
if (rend_client_send_introduction(introcirc, rendcirc) < 0) {
|
||||
switch (rend_client_send_introduction(introcirc, rendcirc)) {
|
||||
case 0: /* success */
|
||||
rendcirc->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
|
||||
introcirc->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
|
||||
assert_circuit_ok(TO_CIRCUIT(rendcirc));
|
||||
assert_circuit_ok(TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc));
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
case -1: /* transient error */
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
case -2: /* permanent error */
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
default: /* oops */
|
||||
tor_fragile_assert();
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
rendcirc->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
|
||||
introcirc->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
|
||||
assert_circuit_ok(TO_CIRCUIT(rendcirc));
|
||||
assert_circuit_ok(TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc));
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -827,7 +827,16 @@ static char *_version = NULL;
|
|||
const char *
|
||||
get_version(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return VERSION;
|
||||
if (_version == NULL) {
|
||||
if (strlen(tor_svn_revision)) {
|
||||
size_t len = strlen(VERSION)+strlen(tor_svn_revision)+16;
|
||||
_version = tor_malloc(len);
|
||||
tor_snprintf(_version, len, "%s (git-%s)", VERSION, tor_svn_revision);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
_version = tor_strdup(VERSION);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return _version;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Release additional memory allocated in options
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -2699,6 +2699,8 @@ dirserv_get_routerdesc_fingerprints(smartlist_t *fps_out, const char *key,
|
|||
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rl->routers, routerinfo_t *, r,
|
||||
smartlist_add(fps_out,
|
||||
tor_memdup(r->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)));
|
||||
/* Treat "all" requests as if they were unencrypted */
|
||||
for_unencrypted_conn = 1;
|
||||
} else if (!strcmp(key, "authority")) {
|
||||
routerinfo_t *ri = router_get_my_routerinfo();
|
||||
if (ri)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1949,7 +1949,7 @@ server_request_free(struct server_request *req)
|
|||
|
||||
if (req->port) {
|
||||
if (req->port->pending_replies == req) {
|
||||
if (req->next_pending)
|
||||
if (req->next_pending && req->next_pending != req)
|
||||
req->port->pending_replies = req->next_pending;
|
||||
else
|
||||
req->port->pending_replies = NULL;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -785,6 +785,8 @@ signewnym_impl(time_t now)
|
|||
{
|
||||
circuit_expire_all_dirty_circs();
|
||||
addressmap_clear_transient();
|
||||
rend_cache_purge();
|
||||
rend_client_cancel_descriptor_fetches();
|
||||
time_of_last_signewnym = now;
|
||||
signewnym_is_pending = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -4039,6 +4039,7 @@ int rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ,
|
|||
size_t request_len);
|
||||
void rend_client_refetch_renddesc(const char *query);
|
||||
void rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(const rend_data_t *rend_query);
|
||||
void rend_client_cancel_descriptor_fetches(void);
|
||||
int rend_client_remove_intro_point(extend_info_t *failed_intro,
|
||||
const rend_data_t *rend_query);
|
||||
int rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ,
|
||||
|
|
@ -4137,6 +4138,7 @@ typedef struct rend_cache_entry_t {
|
|||
void rend_cache_init(void);
|
||||
void rend_cache_clean(void);
|
||||
void rend_cache_clean_v2_descs_as_dir(void);
|
||||
void rend_cache_purge(void);
|
||||
void rend_cache_free_all(void);
|
||||
int rend_valid_service_id(const char *query);
|
||||
int rend_cache_lookup_desc(const char *query, int version, const char **desc,
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -880,6 +880,8 @@ exit_policy_is_general_exit(smartlist_t *policy)
|
|||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
|
||||
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(policy, addr_policy_t *, p, {
|
||||
if (tor_addr_family(&p->addr) != AF_INET)
|
||||
continue; /* IPv4 only for now */
|
||||
if (p->prt_min > ports[i] || p->prt_max < ports[i])
|
||||
continue; /* Doesn't cover our port. */
|
||||
if (p->maskbits > 8)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -74,10 +74,27 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
|
|||
|
||||
if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(introcirc->rend_data->onion_address, -1,
|
||||
&entry) < 1) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_REND,
|
||||
"query %s didn't have valid rend desc in cache. Failing.",
|
||||
escaped_safe_str(introcirc->rend_data->onion_address));
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
log_info(LD_REND,
|
||||
"query %s didn't have valid rend desc in cache. "
|
||||
"Refetching descriptor.",
|
||||
safe_str(introcirc->rend_data->onion_address));
|
||||
/* Fetch both v0 and v2 rend descriptors in parallel. Use whichever
|
||||
* arrives first. Exception: When using client authorization, only
|
||||
* fetch v2 descriptors.*/
|
||||
rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(introcirc->rend_data);
|
||||
if (introcirc->rend_data->auth_type == REND_NO_AUTH)
|
||||
rend_client_refetch_renddesc(introcirc->rend_data->onion_address);
|
||||
{
|
||||
connection_t *conn;
|
||||
|
||||
while ((conn = connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery(CONN_TYPE_AP,
|
||||
AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT,
|
||||
introcirc->rend_data->onion_address, -1))) {
|
||||
conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* first 20 bytes of payload are the hash of Bob's pk */
|
||||
|
|
@ -115,13 +132,13 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
|
|||
log_info(LD_REND, "Internal error: could not find intro key; we "
|
||||
"only have a v2 rend desc with %d intro points.",
|
||||
num_intro_points);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
goto perm_err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(intro_key, payload)<0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't hash public key.");
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
goto perm_err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Initialize the pending_final_cpath and start the DH handshake. */
|
||||
|
|
@ -132,11 +149,11 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
|
|||
cpath->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC;
|
||||
if (!(cpath->dh_handshake_state = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_REND))) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't allocate DH.");
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
goto perm_err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (crypto_dh_generate_public(cpath->dh_handshake_state)<0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't generate g^x.");
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
goto perm_err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -186,7 +203,7 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
|
|||
if (crypto_dh_get_public(cpath->dh_handshake_state, tmp+dh_offset,
|
||||
DH_KEY_LEN)<0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't extract g^x.");
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
goto perm_err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
note_crypto_pk_op(REND_CLIENT);
|
||||
|
|
@ -199,7 +216,7 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
|
|||
PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 0);
|
||||
if (r<0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Internal error: hybrid pk encrypt failed.");
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
goto perm_err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
payload_len = DIGEST_LEN + r;
|
||||
|
|
@ -212,17 +229,17 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
|
|||
introcirc->cpath->prev)<0) {
|
||||
/* introcirc is already marked for close. leave rendcirc alone. */
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't send INTRODUCE1 cell");
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
return -2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Now, we wait for an ACK or NAK on this circuit. */
|
||||
introcirc->_base.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT;
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
perm_err:
|
||||
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
|
||||
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(rendcirc), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
return -2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Called when a rendezvous circuit is open; sends a establish
|
||||
|
|
@ -412,7 +429,7 @@ directory_get_from_hs_dir(const char *desc_id, const rend_data_t *rend_query)
|
|||
tor_assert(rend_query);
|
||||
/* Determine responsible dirs. Even if we can't get all we want,
|
||||
* work with the ones we have. If it's empty, we'll notice below. */
|
||||
(int) hid_serv_get_responsible_directories(responsible_dirs, desc_id);
|
||||
hid_serv_get_responsible_directories(responsible_dirs, desc_id);
|
||||
|
||||
base32_encode(desc_id_base32, sizeof(desc_id_base32),
|
||||
desc_id, DIGEST_LEN);
|
||||
|
|
@ -557,8 +574,45 @@ rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(const rend_data_t *rend_query)
|
|||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Cancel all rendezvous descriptor fetches currently in progress.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void
|
||||
rend_client_cancel_descriptor_fetches(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
smartlist_t *connection_array = get_connection_array();
|
||||
|
||||
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(connection_array, connection_t *, conn) {
|
||||
if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR &&
|
||||
(conn->purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_RENDDESC ||
|
||||
conn->purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_RENDDESC_V2)) {
|
||||
/* It's a rendezvous descriptor fetch in progress -- cancel it
|
||||
* by marking the connection for close.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Even if this connection has already reached EOF, this is
|
||||
* enough to make sure that if the descriptor hasn't been
|
||||
* processed yet, it won't be. See the end of
|
||||
* connection_handle_read; connection_reached_eof (indirectly)
|
||||
* processes whatever response the connection received. */
|
||||
|
||||
const rend_data_t *rd = (TO_DIR_CONN(conn))->rend_data;
|
||||
if (!rd) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG | LD_REND,
|
||||
"Marking for close dir conn fetching rendezvous "
|
||||
"descriptor for unknown service!");
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
log_debug(LD_REND, "Marking for close dir conn fetching v%d "
|
||||
"rendezvous descriptor for service %s",
|
||||
(int)(rd->rend_desc_version),
|
||||
safe_str(rd->onion_address));
|
||||
}
|
||||
connection_mark_for_close(conn);
|
||||
}
|
||||
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Remove failed_intro from ent. If ent now has no intro points, or
|
||||
* service is unrecognized, then launch a new renddesc fetch.
|
||||
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Return -1 if error, 0 if no intro points remain or service
|
||||
* unrecognized, 1 if recognized and some intro points remain.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -871,6 +871,16 @@ rend_cache_clean(void)
|
|||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Remove ALL entries from the rendezvous service descriptor cache.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void
|
||||
rend_cache_purge(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (rend_cache)
|
||||
strmap_free(rend_cache, _rend_cache_entry_free);
|
||||
rend_cache = strmap_new();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Remove all old v2 descriptors and those for which this hidden service
|
||||
* directory is not responsible for any more. */
|
||||
void
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -793,19 +793,14 @@ consider_testing_reachability(int test_or, int test_dir)
|
|||
void
|
||||
router_orport_found_reachable(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (!can_reach_or_port) {
|
||||
routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
|
||||
routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
|
||||
if (!can_reach_or_port && me) {
|
||||
log_notice(LD_OR,"Self-testing indicates your ORPort is reachable from "
|
||||
"the outside. Excellent.%s",
|
||||
get_options()->_PublishServerDescriptor != NO_AUTHORITY ?
|
||||
" Publishing server descriptor." : "");
|
||||
can_reach_or_port = 1;
|
||||
mark_my_descriptor_dirty();
|
||||
if (!me) { /* should never happen */
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "ORPort found reachable, but I have no routerinfo "
|
||||
"yet. Failing to inform controller of success.");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE,
|
||||
"REACHABILITY_SUCCEEDED ORADDRESS=%s:%d",
|
||||
me->address, me->or_port);
|
||||
|
|
@ -816,18 +811,13 @@ router_orport_found_reachable(void)
|
|||
void
|
||||
router_dirport_found_reachable(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (!can_reach_dir_port) {
|
||||
routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
|
||||
routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
|
||||
if (!can_reach_dir_port && me) {
|
||||
log_notice(LD_DIRSERV,"Self-testing indicates your DirPort is reachable "
|
||||
"from the outside. Excellent.");
|
||||
can_reach_dir_port = 1;
|
||||
if (!me || decide_to_advertise_dirport(get_options(), me->dir_port))
|
||||
if (decide_to_advertise_dirport(get_options(), me->dir_port))
|
||||
mark_my_descriptor_dirty();
|
||||
if (!me) { /* should never happen */
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "DirPort found reachable, but I have no routerinfo "
|
||||
"yet. Failing to inform controller of success.");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE,
|
||||
"REACHABILITY_SUCCEEDED DIRADDRESS=%s:%d",
|
||||
me->address, me->dir_port);
|
||||
|
|
@ -1586,8 +1576,6 @@ router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(uint32_t *guess)
|
|||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
extern const char tor_svn_revision[]; /* from tor_main.c */
|
||||
|
||||
/** Set <b>platform</b> (max length <b>len</b>) to a NUL-terminated short
|
||||
* string describing the version of Tor and the operating system we're
|
||||
* currently running on.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1369,6 +1369,12 @@ router_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end,
|
|||
router->has_old_dnsworkers = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_REJECT6) ||
|
||||
find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_ACCEPT6)) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Rejecting router with reject6/accept6 line: they crash "
|
||||
"older Tors.");
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
exit_policy_tokens = find_all_exitpolicy(tokens);
|
||||
if (!smartlist_len(exit_policy_tokens)) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_DIR, "No exit policy tokens in descriptor.");
|
||||
|
|
@ -3622,8 +3628,10 @@ rend_parse_v2_service_descriptor(rend_service_descriptor_t **parsed_out,
|
|||
eos = eos + 1;
|
||||
/* Check length. */
|
||||
if (strlen(desc) > REND_DESC_MAX_SIZE) {
|
||||
/* XXX023 If we are parsing this descriptor as a server, this
|
||||
* should be a protocol warning. */
|
||||
log_warn(LD_REND, "Descriptor length is %i which exceeds "
|
||||
"maximum rendezvous descriptor size of %i kilobytes.",
|
||||
"maximum rendezvous descriptor size of %i bytes.",
|
||||
(int)strlen(desc), REND_DESC_MAX_SIZE);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue