Backport: Fix bug 889: share deep-copied keys between threads to avoid races in reference counts. Bugfix on 0.1.0.1-rc.
svn:r17674
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@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ Changes in version 0.2.0.33 - 200?-??-??
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- Fix a memory leak when we decline to add a v2 rendezvous descriptor to
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the cache because we already had a v0 descriptor with the same ID.
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Bugfix on 0.2.0.18-alpha.
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- Fix a race condition when freeing keys shared between main thread
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and CPU workers that could result in a memory leak. Bugfix on
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0.1.0.1-rc. Fixes bug 889.
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o Minor features:
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- Report the case where all signatures in a detached set are rejected
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@ -631,6 +631,23 @@ crypto_pk_dup_key(crypto_pk_env_t *env)
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return env;
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}
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/** Make a real honest-to-goodness copy of <b>env</b>, and return it. */
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crypto_pk_env_t *
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crypto_pk_copy_full(crypto_pk_env_t *env)
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{
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RSA *new_key;
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tor_assert(env);
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tor_assert(env->key);
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if (PRIVATE_KEY_OK(env)) {
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new_key = RSAPrivateKey_dup(env->key);
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} else {
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new_key = RSAPublicKey_dup(env->key);
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}
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return _crypto_new_pk_env_rsa(new_key);
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}
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/** Encrypt <b>fromlen</b> bytes from <b>from</b> with the public key
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* in <b>env</b>, using the padding method <b>padding</b>. On success,
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* write the result to <b>to</b>, and return the number of bytes
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@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ int crypto_pk_check_key(crypto_pk_env_t *env);
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int crypto_pk_cmp_keys(crypto_pk_env_t *a, crypto_pk_env_t *b);
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size_t crypto_pk_keysize(crypto_pk_env_t *env);
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crypto_pk_env_t *crypto_pk_dup_key(crypto_pk_env_t *orig);
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crypto_pk_env_t *crypto_pk_copy_full(crypto_pk_env_t *orig);
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int crypto_pk_public_encrypt(crypto_pk_env_t *env, char *to,
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const char *from, size_t fromlen, int padding);
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@ -75,8 +75,8 @@ get_onion_key(void)
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return onionkey;
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}
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/** Store a copy of the current onion key into *<b>key</b>, and a copy
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* of the most recent onion key into *<b>last</b>.
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/** Store a full copy of the current onion key into *<b>key</b>, and a full
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* copy of the most recent onion key into *<b>last</b>.
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*/
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void
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dup_onion_keys(crypto_pk_env_t **key, crypto_pk_env_t **last)
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@ -85,9 +85,9 @@ dup_onion_keys(crypto_pk_env_t **key, crypto_pk_env_t **last)
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tor_assert(last);
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tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
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tor_assert(onionkey);
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*key = crypto_pk_dup_key(onionkey);
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*key = crypto_pk_copy_full(onionkey);
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if (lastonionkey)
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*last = crypto_pk_dup_key(lastonionkey);
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*last = crypto_pk_copy_full(lastonionkey);
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else
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*last = NULL;
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tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
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