Roger Dingledine
parent
fe962c58d3
commit
9bacf68851
|
|
@ -4,6 +4,15 @@ Changes in version 0.2.0.6-alpha - 2007-??-??
|
|||
mean-times-between-failures. When we have 4 or more days of data,
|
||||
use measured MTBF rather than declared uptime to decide whether
|
||||
to call a router Stable. Implements proposal 108.
|
||||
- When choosing nodes for non-guard positions, weight guards
|
||||
proportionally less, since they already have enough load. Patch
|
||||
from Mike Perry.
|
||||
- Raise the "max believable bandwidth" from 1.5MB/s to 10MB/s. This
|
||||
will allow fast Tor servers to get more attention. Also, when we're
|
||||
upgrading from an old Tor version, forget our current guards and
|
||||
pick new ones according to the new weightings. The resulting load
|
||||
balancing improvement could raise effective network capacity by
|
||||
a factor of four. Thanks to Mike Perry for measurements.
|
||||
|
||||
o Major bugfixes:
|
||||
- Handle unexpected whitespace better in malformed descriptors. Bug
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -299,10 +299,12 @@ static config_var_t _state_vars[] = {
|
|||
VAR("AccountingExpectedUsage", MEMUNIT, AccountingExpectedUsage, NULL),
|
||||
VAR("AccountingIntervalStart", ISOTIME, AccountingIntervalStart, NULL),
|
||||
VAR("AccountingSecondsActive", INTERVAL, AccountingSecondsActive, NULL),
|
||||
|
||||
VAR("EntryGuard", LINELIST_S, EntryGuards, NULL),
|
||||
VAR("EntryGuardDownSince", LINELIST_S, EntryGuards, NULL),
|
||||
VAR("EntryGuardUnlistedSince", LINELIST_S, EntryGuards, NULL),
|
||||
VAR("EntryGuards", LINELIST_V, EntryGuards, NULL),
|
||||
VAR("GuardVersion", UINT, GuardVersion, "0"),
|
||||
|
||||
VAR("BWHistoryReadEnds", ISOTIME, BWHistoryReadEnds, NULL),
|
||||
VAR("BWHistoryReadInterval", UINT, BWHistoryReadInterval, "900"),
|
||||
|
|
@ -529,6 +531,8 @@ static config_var_description_t state_description[] = {
|
|||
"The last entry guard has been unreachable since this time." },
|
||||
{ "EntryGuardUnlistedSince",
|
||||
"The last entry guard has been unusable since this time." },
|
||||
{ "GuardVersion", "Which algorithm did we use to pick these guards?" },
|
||||
|
||||
{ "LastRotatedOnionKey",
|
||||
"The last time at which we changed the medium-term private key used for "
|
||||
"building circuits." },
|
||||
|
|
@ -4332,6 +4336,12 @@ get_or_state_fname(void)
|
|||
return fname;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** What's the newest known version for our guard-picking algorithm?
|
||||
* If the version in the state file is older than this (or if there is
|
||||
* no version listed in the state file), we want to ignore the guards
|
||||
* in the state file and pick new ones. */
|
||||
#define RECOMMENDED_GUARD_VERSION 1
|
||||
|
||||
/** Return 0 if every setting in <b>state</b> is reasonable, and a
|
||||
* permissible transition from <b>old_state</b>. Else warn and return -1.
|
||||
* Should have no side effects, except for normalizing the contents of
|
||||
|
|
@ -4346,27 +4356,17 @@ or_state_validate(or_state_t *old_state, or_state_t *state,
|
|||
* signature. */
|
||||
(void) from_setconf;
|
||||
(void) old_state;
|
||||
if (entry_guards_parse_state(state, 0, msg)<0) {
|
||||
|
||||
if (state->GuardVersion < RECOMMENDED_GUARD_VERSION) {
|
||||
config_free_lines(state->EntryGuards);
|
||||
state->EntryGuards = NULL;
|
||||
log_notice(LD_CONFIG, "Detected state file from old version '%s'. "
|
||||
"Choosing new entry guards for you.",
|
||||
state->TorVersion ? state->TorVersion : "unknown");
|
||||
state->GuardVersion = RECOMMENDED_GUARD_VERSION;
|
||||
} else if (entry_guards_parse_state(state, 0, msg)<0) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (state->TorVersion) {
|
||||
tor_version_t v;
|
||||
if (tor_version_parse(state->TorVersion, &v)) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Can't parse Tor version '%s' from your state "
|
||||
"file. Proceeding anyway.", state->TorVersion);
|
||||
} else { /* take action based on v */
|
||||
if ((tor_version_as_new_as(state->TorVersion, "0.1.1.10-alpha") &&
|
||||
!tor_version_as_new_as(state->TorVersion, "0.1.2.17-dev"))
|
||||
|| (tor_version_as_new_as(state->TorVersion, "0.2.0.0-alpha") &&
|
||||
!tor_version_as_new_as(state->TorVersion, "0.2.0.6-alpha-dev"))) {
|
||||
log_notice(LD_CONFIG, "Detected state file from buggy version '%s'. "
|
||||
"Enabling workaround to choose working entry guards.",
|
||||
state->TorVersion);
|
||||
config_free_lines(state->EntryGuards);
|
||||
state->EntryGuards = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -2111,6 +2111,11 @@ typedef struct {
|
|||
|
||||
/** A list of Entry Guard-related configuration lines. */
|
||||
config_line_t *EntryGuards;
|
||||
/** What algorithm did we use to select these guards? 0 if we didn't
|
||||
* know about the GuardVersion concept when we picked them. We use
|
||||
* this to expire and re-pick our guards if Tor knows about a newer
|
||||
* version than the state file lists. */
|
||||
int GuardVersion;
|
||||
|
||||
/** These fields hold information on the history of bandwidth usage for
|
||||
* servers. The "Ends" fields hold the time when we last updated the
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1262,7 +1262,18 @@ router_get_advertised_bandwidth(routerinfo_t *router)
|
|||
|
||||
/** Do not weight any declared bandwidth more than this much when picking
|
||||
* routers by bandwidth. */
|
||||
#define MAX_BELIEVABLE_BANDWIDTH 10000000 /* 10 MB/sec */
|
||||
#define DEFAULT_MAX_BELIEVABLE_BANDWIDTH 10000000 /* 10 MB/sec */
|
||||
|
||||
/** Eventually, the number we return will come from the directory
|
||||
* consensus, so clients can dynamically update to better numbers.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* But for now, or in case there is no consensus available, just return
|
||||
* a sufficient default. */
|
||||
static uint32_t
|
||||
get_max_believable_bandwidth(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return DEFAULT_MAX_BELIEVABLE_BANDWIDTH;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Helper function:
|
||||
* choose a random element of smartlist <b>sl</b>, weighted by
|
||||
|
|
@ -1301,6 +1312,7 @@ smartlist_choose_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl, int for_exit, int for_guard,
|
|||
int n_unknown = 0;
|
||||
bitarray_t *exit_bits;
|
||||
bitarray_t *guard_bits;
|
||||
uint32_t max_believable_bw = get_max_believable_bandwidth();
|
||||
|
||||
/* Can't choose exit and guard at same time */
|
||||
tor_assert(!(for_exit && for_guard));
|
||||
|
|
@ -1344,7 +1356,7 @@ smartlist_choose_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl, int for_exit, int for_guard,
|
|||
if (is_guard)
|
||||
bitarray_set(guard_bits, i);
|
||||
/* if they claim something huge, don't believe it */
|
||||
if (this_bw > MAX_BELIEVABLE_BANDWIDTH) {
|
||||
if (this_bw > max_believable_bw) {
|
||||
char fp[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
|
||||
if (status) {
|
||||
base16_encode(fp, sizeof(fp),
|
||||
|
|
@ -1357,8 +1369,8 @@ smartlist_choose_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl, int for_exit, int for_guard,
|
|||
"Bandwidth %d for router %s (%s) exceeds allowed max %d, capping",
|
||||
this_bw, router ? router->nickname : "(null)",
|
||||
status || router ? fp : "0",
|
||||
MAX_BELIEVABLE_BANDWIDTH);
|
||||
this_bw = MAX_BELIEVABLE_BANDWIDTH;
|
||||
max_believable_bw);
|
||||
this_bw = max_believable_bw;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (is_known) {
|
||||
bandwidths[i] = (int32_t) this_bw; // safe since MAX_BELIEVABLE<INT32_MAX
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue