Merge branch 'maint-0.2.4' into release-0.2.4
This commit is contained in:
commit
a1963695ca
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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o Minor features (usability):
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- Warn and fail if a server is configured not to advertise any
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ORPorts at all. (We need *something* to put in our descriptor, or
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we just won't work.)
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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o Minor bugfixes:
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- Avoid overflows when the user sets MaxCircuitDirtiness to a
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ridiculously high value, by imposing a (ridiculously high) 30-day
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maximum on MaxCircuitDirtiness.
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@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
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o Major bugfixes:
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- When a relay is extending a circuit to a bridge, it needs to send a
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NETINFO cell, even when the bridge hasn't sent an AUTH_CHALLENGE
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cell. Fixes bug 9546; bugfix on 0.2.3.6-alpha.
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- Bridges send AUTH_CHALLENGE cells during their handshakes; previously
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they did not, which prevented relays from successfully connecting
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to a bridge for self-test or bandwidth testing. Fixes bug 9546;
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bugfix on 0.2.3.6-alpha.
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@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
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o Minor bugfixes:
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- If the time to download the next old-style networkstatus is in
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the future, do not decline to consider whether to download the
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next microdescriptor networkstatus. Fixes bug 9564. Bugfix on
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0.2.3.14-alpha.
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
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o Minor documentation fixes:
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- Fix the documentation of HeartbeatPeriod to say that the heartbeat
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message is logged at notice, not at info.
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
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o Minor features:
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- Update to the August 7 2013 Maxmind GeoLite Country database.
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@ -1530,7 +1530,7 @@ is non-zero):
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**HeartbeatPeriod** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
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Log a heartbeat message every **HeartbeatPeriod** seconds. This is
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a log level __info__ message, designed to let you know your Tor
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a log level __notice__ message, designed to let you know your Tor
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server is still alive and doing useful things. Settings this
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to 0 will disable the heartbeat. (Default: 6 hours)
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9207
src/config/geoip
9207
src/config/geoip
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
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@ -1262,8 +1262,8 @@ channel_tls_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
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const int send_versions = !started_here;
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/* If we want to authenticate, send a CERTS cell */
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const int send_certs = !started_here || public_server_mode(get_options());
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/* If we're a relay that got a connection, ask for authentication. */
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const int send_chall = !started_here && public_server_mode(get_options());
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/* If we're a host that got a connection, ask for authentication. */
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const int send_chall = !started_here;
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/* If our certs cell will authenticate us, we can send a netinfo cell
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* right now. */
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const int send_netinfo = !started_here;
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@ -1474,6 +1474,16 @@ channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
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/* XXX maybe act on my_apparent_addr, if the source is sufficiently
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* trustworthy. */
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if (! chan->conn->handshake_state->sent_netinfo) {
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/* If we were prepared to authenticate, but we never got an AUTH_CHALLENGE
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* cell, then we would not previously have sent a NETINFO cell. Do so
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* now. */
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if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) {
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connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);
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return;
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}
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}
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if (connection_or_set_state_open(chan->conn) < 0) {
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
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"Got good NETINFO cell from %s:%d; but "
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@ -2266,6 +2266,10 @@ compute_publishserverdescriptor(or_options_t *options)
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* will generate too many circuits and potentially overload the network. */
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#define MIN_MAX_CIRCUIT_DIRTINESS 10
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/** Highest allowable value for MaxCircuitDirtiness: prevents time_t
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* overflows. */
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#define MAX_MAX_CIRCUIT_DIRTINESS (30*24*60*60)
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/** Lowest allowable value for CircuitStreamTimeout; if this is too low, Tor
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* will generate too many circuits and potentially overload the network. */
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#define MIN_CIRCUIT_STREAM_TIMEOUT 10
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@ -2786,6 +2790,12 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options,
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options->MaxCircuitDirtiness = MIN_MAX_CIRCUIT_DIRTINESS;
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}
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if (options->MaxCircuitDirtiness > MAX_MAX_CIRCUIT_DIRTINESS) {
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log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "MaxCircuitDirtiness option is too high; "
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"setting to %d days.", MAX_MAX_CIRCUIT_DIRTINESS/86400);
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options->MaxCircuitDirtiness = MAX_MAX_CIRCUIT_DIRTINESS;
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}
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if (options->CircuitStreamTimeout &&
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options->CircuitStreamTimeout < MIN_CIRCUIT_STREAM_TIMEOUT) {
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log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "CircuitStreamTimeout option is too short; "
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@ -5509,6 +5519,13 @@ check_server_ports(const smartlist_t *ports,
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"listening on one.");
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r = -1;
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}
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if (n_orport_listeners && !n_orport_advertised) {
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log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "We are listening on an ORPort, but not advertising "
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"any ORPorts. This will keep us from building a %s "
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"descriptor, and make us impossible to use.",
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options->BridgeRelay ? "bridge" : "router");
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r = -1;
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}
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if (n_dirport_advertised && !n_dirport_listeners) {
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log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "We are advertising a DirPort, but not actually "
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"listening on one.");
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@ -2042,6 +2042,12 @@ connection_or_send_netinfo(or_connection_t *conn)
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tor_assert(conn->handshake_state);
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if (conn->handshake_state->sent_netinfo) {
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log_warn(LD_BUG, "Attempted to send an extra netinfo cell on a connection "
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"where we already sent one.");
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return 0;
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}
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memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t));
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cell.command = CELL_NETINFO;
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}
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conn->handshake_state->digest_sent_data = 0;
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conn->handshake_state->sent_netinfo = 1;
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connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&cell, conn);
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return 0;
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const tor_cert_t *id_cert=NULL, *link_cert=NULL;
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const digests_t *my_digests, *their_digests;
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const uint8_t *my_id, *their_id, *client_id, *server_id;
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if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(0, &link_cert, &id_cert))
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if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(server, &link_cert, &id_cert))
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return -1;
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my_digests = tor_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert);
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their_digests = tor_cert_get_id_digests(conn->handshake_state->id_cert);
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@ -1233,7 +1233,7 @@ update_consensus_networkstatus_downloads(time_t now)
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}
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if (time_to_download_next_consensus[i] > now)
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return; /* Wait until the current consensus is older. */
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continue; /* Wait until the current consensus is older. */
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resource = networkstatus_get_flavor_name(i);
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@ -1357,6 +1357,9 @@ typedef struct or_handshake_state_t {
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/* True iff we've received valid authentication to some identity. */
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unsigned int authenticated : 1;
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/* True iff we have sent a netinfo cell */
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unsigned int sent_netinfo : 1;
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/** True iff we should feed outgoing cells into digest_sent and
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* digest_received respectively.
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*
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