fold in changes entries so far
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21
ChangeLog
21
ChangeLog
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@ -1,3 +1,24 @@
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Changes in version 0.2.2.38 - 2012-08-??
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o Security fixes:
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- Avoid read-from-freed-memory and double-free bugs that could occur
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when a DNS request fails while launching it. Fixes bug 6480;
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bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha.
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- Avoid an uninitialized memory read when reading a vote or consensus
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document that has an unrecognized flavor name. This read could
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lead to a remote crash bug. Fixes bug 6530; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha.
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- Try to leak less information about what relays a client is
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choosing to a side-channel attacker. Previously, a Tor client would
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stop iterating through the list of available relays as soon as it
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had chosen one, thus finishing a little earlier when it picked
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a router earlier in the list. If an attacker can recover this
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timing information (nontrivial but not proven to be impossible),
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they could learn some coarse-grained information about which relays
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a client was picking (middle nodes in particular are likelier to
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be affected than exits). The timing attack might be mitigated by
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other factors (see bug 6537 for some discussion), but it's best
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not to take chances. Fixes bug 6537; bugfix on 0.0.8rc1.
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Changes in version 0.2.2.37 - 2012-06-06
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Tor 0.2.2.37 introduces a workaround for a critical renegotiation
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bug in OpenSSL 1.0.1 (where 20% of the Tor network can't talk to itself
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21
ReleaseNotes
21
ReleaseNotes
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@ -3,6 +3,27 @@ This document summarizes new features and bugfixes in each stable release
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of Tor. If you want to see more detailed descriptions of the changes in
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each development snapshot, see the ChangeLog file.
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Changes in version 0.2.2.38 - 2012-08-??
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o Security fixes:
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- Avoid read-from-freed-memory and double-free bugs that could occur
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when a DNS request fails while launching it. Fixes bug 6480;
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bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha.
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- Avoid an uninitialized memory read when reading a vote or consensus
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document that has an unrecognized flavor name. This read could
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lead to a remote crash bug. Fixes bug 6530; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha.
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- Try to leak less information about what relays a client is
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choosing to a side-channel attacker. Previously, a Tor client would
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stop iterating through the list of available relays as soon as it
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had chosen one, thus finishing a little earlier when it picked
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a router earlier in the list. If an attacker can recover this
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timing information (nontrivial but not proven to be impossible),
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they could learn some coarse-grained information about which relays
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a client was picking (middle nodes in particular are likelier to
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be affected than exits). The timing attack might be mitigated by
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other factors (see bug 6537 for some discussion), but it's best
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not to take chances. Fixes bug 6537; bugfix on 0.0.8rc1.
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Changes in version 0.2.2.37 - 2012-06-06
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Tor 0.2.2.37 introduces a workaround for a critical renegotiation
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bug in OpenSSL 1.0.1 (where 20% of the Tor network can't talk to itself
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@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
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o Major security fixes:
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- Avoid a read of uninitializd RAM when reading a vote or consensus
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document with an unrecognized flavor name. This could lead to a
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remote crash bug. Fixes bug 6530; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha.
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@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
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o Minor features:
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- Update to the June 6 2012 Maxmind GeoLite Country database.
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@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
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o Security fixes:
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- Try to leak less information about what relays a client is
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choosing to a side-channel attacker. Previously, a Tor client
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would stop iterating through the list of available relays as
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soon as it had chosen one, thus finishing a little earlier
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when it picked a router earlier in the list. If an attacker
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can recover this timing information (nontrivial but not
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proven to be impossible), they could learn some coarse-
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grained information about which relays a client was picking
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(middle nodes in particular are likelier to be affected than
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exits). The timing attack might be mitigated by other factors
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(see bug #6537 for some discussion), but it's best not to
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take chances. Fixes bug 6537; bugfix on 0.0.8rc1.
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@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
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o Major bugfixes:
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- Revert to the May 1 2012 Maxmind GeoLite Country database. In the
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June 2012 database, Maxmind marked many Tor relays as country "A1",
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which will cause risky behavior for clients that set EntryNodes
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or ExitNodes. Addresses bug 6334; bugfix on 0.2.3.17-beta.
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