Backport r17139: Fix another case of refusing to use a chosen exit node because we think it will reject _mostly_ everything. Based on patch from rovv. See bug 752.
svn:r17640
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@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ Changes in version 0.2.0.33 - 200?-??-??
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- When we're choosing an exit node for a circuit, and we have no pending
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streams, choose a good general exit rather than one that supports "all
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the pending streams". Bugfix on 0.1.1.x. (Fix by rovv.)
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- Fix another case of assuming, when a specific exit is requested,
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that we know more than the user about what hosts it allows.
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Fixes one case of bug 752. Patch from rovv.
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o Minor features:
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- Report the case where all signatures in a detached set are rejected
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@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Backport for 0.2.0 once better tested:
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o ... and r17184.
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- r17137: send END cell in response to connect to nonexistent hidserv port.
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- r17138: reject *:* servers should never do DNS lookups.
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- r17139: Fix another case of overriding .exit choices.
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o r17139: Fix another case of overriding .exit choices.
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- r17162 and r17164: fix another case of not checking cpath_layer.
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- r17208,r17209,r7211,r17212,r17214: Avoid gotterdammerung when an
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authority has an expired certificate.
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@ -1015,17 +1015,38 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(edge_connection_t *conn,
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/* Do we need to check exit policy? */
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if (check_exit_policy) {
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struct in_addr in;
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uint32_t addr = 0;
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if (tor_inet_aton(conn->socks_request->address, &in))
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addr = ntohl(in.s_addr);
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if (router_exit_policy_all_routers_reject(addr, conn->socks_request->port,
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need_uptime)) {
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log_notice(LD_APP,
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"No Tor server exists that allows exit to %s:%d. Rejecting.",
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safe_str(conn->socks_request->address),
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conn->socks_request->port);
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return -1;
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if (!conn->chosen_exit_name) {
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struct in_addr in;
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uint32_t addr = 0;
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if (tor_inet_aton(conn->socks_request->address, &in))
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addr = ntohl(in.s_addr);
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if (router_exit_policy_all_routers_reject(addr, conn->socks_request->port,
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need_uptime)) {
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log_notice(LD_APP,
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"No Tor server exists that allows exit to %s:%d. Rejecting.",
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safe_str(conn->socks_request->address),
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conn->socks_request->port);
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return -1;
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}
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} else {
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/* XXXX021 Duplicates checks in connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit
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* XXXX021 Fix this, then backport it? */
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routerinfo_t *router = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1);
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int opt = conn->_base.chosen_exit_optional;
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if (router && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, router)) {
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log_fn(opt ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_APP,
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"Requested exit point '%s' would refuse request. %s.",
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conn->chosen_exit_name, opt ? "Trying others" : "Closing");
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if (opt) {
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conn->_base.chosen_exit_optional = 0;
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tor_free(conn->chosen_exit_name);
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/* Try again. */
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return circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(conn,
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desired_circuit_purpose,
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circp);
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}
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return -1;
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}
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}
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}
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