Merge branch 'maint-0.2.3' into release-0.2.3
This commit is contained in:
Roger Dingledine
commit
f52fd41842
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@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
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o Documentation fixes:
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- Clarify that hidden services are TCP only. Fixes bug 6024.
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@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
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o Major bugfixes:
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- Fix a possible crash bug when checking for deactivated circuits
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in connection_or_flush_from_first_active_circuit(). Fixes bug
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6341; bugfix on 0.2.2.7-alpha. Bug report and fix received
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pseudonymously.
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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
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o Minor bugfixes:
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- Avoid undefined behaviour when parsing the list of supported
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rendezvous/introduction protocols in a hidden service
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descriptor. Previously, Tor would have confused (as-yet-unused)
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protocol version numbers greater than 32 with lower ones on many
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platforms. Fixes bug 6827; bugfix on 0.2.0.10-alpha; found by
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George Kadianakis.
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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o Minor bugfixes:
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- Correct file sizes when reading binary files on
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Cygwin, to avoid a bug where Tor would fail to read its state file.
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Fixes bug 6844; bugfix on 0.1.2.7-alpha.
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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o Minor bugfixes:
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- Convert an assert in the pathbias code to a log message. Assert
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appears to only be triggerable by Tor2Web mode. Fixes bug 6866;
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bugfix on 0.2.3.17-beta.
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@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
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o Minor bugfixes:
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- Fix two cases in src/or/transports.c where we were calling
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fmt_addr() twice in a parameter list. Bug found by David
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Fifield. Fixes bug 7014; bugfix on 0.2.3.9-alpha.
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
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o Minor bugfixes:
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- Fix memory leaks whenever we logged any message about the "path
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bias" detection. Fixes bug 7022; bugfix on 0.2.3.21-rc.
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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
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o Minor bugfixes:
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- When relays refuse a "create" cell because their queue of pending
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create cells is too big (typically because their cpu can't keep up
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with the arrival rate), send back reason "resource limit" rather
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than reason "internal", so network measurement scripts can get a
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more accurate picture. Bugfix on 0.1.1.11-alpha; fixes bug 7037.
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
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o New directory authorities:
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- Add Faravahar (run by Sina Rabbani) as the ninth v3 directory
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authority. Closes ticket 5749.
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@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ COMMAND-LINE OPTIONS
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Other options can be specified on the command-line in the format "--option
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value", in the format "option value", or in a configuration file. For
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instance, you can tell Tor to start listening for SOCKS connections on port
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9999 by passing --SOCKSPort 9999 or SOCKPort 9999 to it on the command line,
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9999 by passing --SOCKSPort 9999 or SOCKSPort 9999 to it on the command line,
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or by putting "SOCKSPort 9999" in the configuration file. You will need to
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quote options with spaces in them: if you want Tor to log all debugging
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messages to debug.log, you will probably need to say --Log 'debug file
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@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS
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recommend that you leave this alone unless you know what you're doing,
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since giving attackers access to your control listener is really
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dangerous. This directive can be specified multiple
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times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. (Default: 127.0.0.1)
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times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. (Default: 127.0.0.1)
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**ControlSocket** __Path__::
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Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP
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@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
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purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times
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for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and
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this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden
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services can be configured to require authorization using the
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services can be configured to require authorization using the
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**HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** option.
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**CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout** **0**|**1**::
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@ -1017,7 +1017,7 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
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Open this port to listen for transparent proxy connections. Set this to
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0 if you don't want to allow transparent proxy connections. Set the port
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to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. This directive can be
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specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. See
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specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. See
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SOCKSPort for an explanation of isolation flags. +
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+
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TransPort requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or
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@ -1055,7 +1055,7 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
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**AutomapHostsOnResolve** **0**|**1**::
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When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an address
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that ends with one of the suffixes in **AutomapHostsSuffixes**, we map an
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unused virtual address to that address, and return the new virtual address.
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unused virtual address to that address, and return the new virtual address.
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This is handy for making ".onion" addresses work with applications that
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resolve an address and then connect to it. (Default: 0)
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@ -1747,10 +1747,11 @@ The following options are used to configure a hidden service.
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Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this
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option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most
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recent hiddenservicedir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to
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the same port on 127.0.0.1. You may override the target port, address, or
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both by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port. You may also have
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multiple lines with the same VIRTPORT: when a user connects to that
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VIRTPORT, one of the TARGETs from those lines will be chosen at random.
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the same port on 127.0.0.1 over TCP. You may override the target port,
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address, or both by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port.
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You may also have multiple lines with the same VIRTPORT: when a user
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connects to that VIRTPORT, one of the TARGETs from those lines will be
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chosen at random.
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**PublishHidServDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
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If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but it won't
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@ -1775,7 +1776,7 @@ The following options are used to configure a hidden service.
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their configuration file using **HidServAuth**.
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**RendPostPeriod** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
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Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous
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Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous
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service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also
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uploaded whenever it changes. (Default: 1 hour)
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@ -2322,7 +2322,7 @@ read_file_to_str(const char *filename, int flags, struct stat *stat_out)
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}
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string[r] = '\0'; /* NUL-terminate the result. */
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#ifdef _WIN32
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#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
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if (!bin && strchr(string, '\r')) {
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log_debug(LD_FS, "We didn't convert CRLF to LF as well as we hoped "
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"when reading %s. Coping.",
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@ -2646,8 +2646,25 @@ pathbias_count_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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char *rate_msg = NULL;
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/* Completely ignore one hop circuits */
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if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
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tor_assert(circ->build_state->desired_path_len == 1);
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if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel ||
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circ->build_state->desired_path_len == 1) {
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/* Check for inconsistency */
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if (circ->build_state->desired_path_len != 1 ||
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!circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
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if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit,
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approx_time()))) {
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log_info(LD_BUG,
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"One-hop circuit has length %d. Path state is %s. "
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"Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
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circ->build_state->desired_path_len,
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pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
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circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose),
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circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state),
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rate_msg);
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tor_free(rate_msg);
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}
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tor_fragile_assert();
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}
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return 0;
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}
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@ -2658,11 +2675,12 @@ pathbias_count_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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approx_time()))) {
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log_info(LD_BUG,
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"Opened circuit is in strange path state %s. "
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"Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s",
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"Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
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pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
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circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose),
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circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state),
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rate_msg);
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tor_free(rate_msg);
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}
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}
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@ -2685,11 +2703,12 @@ pathbias_count_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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approx_time()))) {
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log_info(LD_BUG,
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"Unopened circuit has strange path state %s. "
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"Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s",
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"Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
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pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
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circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose),
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circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state),
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rate_msg);
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tor_free(rate_msg);
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}
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}
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} else {
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@ -2697,10 +2716,11 @@ pathbias_count_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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approx_time()))) {
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log_info(LD_BUG,
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"Unopened circuit has no known guard. "
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"Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s",
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"Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
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circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose),
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circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state),
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rate_msg);
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tor_free(rate_msg);
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}
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}
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}
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@ -2711,12 +2731,13 @@ pathbias_count_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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approx_time()))) {
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log_info(LD_BUG,
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"A %s circuit is in cpath state %d (opened: %d). "
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"Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s",
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"Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
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pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
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circ->cpath->state, circ->has_opened,
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circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose),
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circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state),
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rate_msg);
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tor_free(rate_msg);
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}
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}
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}
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@ -2740,8 +2761,25 @@ pathbias_count_success(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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char *rate_msg = NULL;
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/* Ignore one hop circuits */
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if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
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tor_assert(circ->build_state->desired_path_len == 1);
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if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel ||
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circ->build_state->desired_path_len == 1) {
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/* Check for consistency */
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if (circ->build_state->desired_path_len != 1 ||
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!circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
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if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit,
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approx_time()))) {
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log_info(LD_BUG,
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"One-hop circuit has length %d. Path state is %s. "
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"Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
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circ->build_state->desired_path_len,
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pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
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circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose),
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circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state),
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rate_msg);
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tor_free(rate_msg);
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}
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tor_fragile_assert();
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}
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return;
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}
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@ -2763,11 +2801,12 @@ pathbias_count_success(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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approx_time()))) {
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log_info(LD_BUG,
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"Succeeded circuit is in strange path state %s. "
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"Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s",
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"Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
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pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
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circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose),
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circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state),
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rate_msg);
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tor_free(rate_msg);
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}
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}
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@ -2782,10 +2821,11 @@ pathbias_count_success(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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approx_time()))) {
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log_info(LD_BUG,
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"Completed circuit has no known guard. "
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"Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s",
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"Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
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circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose),
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circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state),
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rate_msg);
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tor_free(rate_msg);
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}
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}
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} else {
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@ -2794,11 +2834,12 @@ pathbias_count_success(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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approx_time()))) {
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log_info(LD_BUG,
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"Opened circuit is in strange path state %s. "
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"Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s",
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"Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
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pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
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circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose),
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circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state),
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rate_msg);
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tor_free(rate_msg);
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}
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}
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}
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|
@ -5269,19 +5310,22 @@ transport_resolve_conflicts(transport_t *t)
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t_tmp->marked_for_removal = 0;
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return 1;
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} else { /* same name but different addrport */
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char *new_transport_addr = tor_strdup(fmt_addr(&t->addr));
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if (t_tmp->marked_for_removal) { /* marked for removal */
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log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "You tried to add transport '%s' at '%s:%u' "
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"but there was already a transport marked for deletion at "
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"'%s:%u'. We deleted the old transport and registered the "
|
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"new one.", t->name, fmt_addr(&t->addr), t->port,
|
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"new one.", t->name, new_transport_addr, t->port,
|
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fmt_addr(&t_tmp->addr), t_tmp->port);
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smartlist_remove(transport_list, t_tmp);
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transport_free(t_tmp);
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tor_free(new_transport_addr);
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} else { /* *not* marked for removal */
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log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "You tried to add transport '%s' at '%s:%u' "
|
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"but the same transport already exists at '%s:%u'. "
|
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"Skipping.", t->name, fmt_addr(&t->addr), t->port,
|
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"Skipping.", t->name, new_transport_addr, t->port,
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fmt_addr(&t_tmp->addr), t_tmp->port);
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tor_free(new_transport_addr);
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return -1;
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}
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}
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|
|
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|
|
@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ command_process_create_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
|
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log_warn(LD_GENERAL,"Failed to hand off onionskin. Closing.%s",m);
|
||||
tor_free(m);
|
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}
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circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
|
||||
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT);
|
||||
return;
|
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}
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||||
log_debug(LD_OR,"success: handed off onionskin.");
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|
|
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|||
|
|
@ -969,6 +969,9 @@ add_default_trusted_dir_authorities(dirinfo_type_t type)
|
|||
"maatuska orport=80 no-v2 "
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"v3ident=49015F787433103580E3B66A1707A00E60F2D15B "
|
||||
"171.25.193.9:443 BD6A 8292 55CB 08E6 6FBE 7D37 4836 3586 E46B 3810",
|
||||
"Faravahar orport=443 no-v2 "
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||||
"v3ident=EFCBE720AB3A82B99F9E953CD5BF50F7EEFC7B97 "
|
||||
"154.35.32.5:80 CF6D 0AAF B385 BE71 B8E1 11FC 5CFF 4B47 9237 33BC",
|
||||
NULL
|
||||
};
|
||||
for (i=0; dirservers[i]; i++) {
|
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|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -4279,14 +4279,17 @@ typedef struct rend_intro_point_t {
|
|||
time_t time_expiring;
|
||||
} rend_intro_point_t;
|
||||
|
||||
#define REND_PROTOCOL_VERSION_BITMASK_WIDTH 16
|
||||
|
||||
/** Information used to connect to a hidden service. Used on both the
|
||||
* service side and the client side. */
|
||||
typedef struct rend_service_descriptor_t {
|
||||
crypto_pk_t *pk; /**< This service's public key. */
|
||||
int version; /**< Version of the descriptor format: 0 or 2. */
|
||||
time_t timestamp; /**< Time when the descriptor was generated. */
|
||||
uint16_t protocols; /**< Bitmask: which rendezvous protocols are supported?
|
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* (We allow bits '0', '1', and '2' to be set.) */
|
||||
/** Bitmask: which rendezvous protocols are supported?
|
||||
* (We allow bits '0', '1', and '2' to be set.) */
|
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int protocols : REND_PROTOCOL_VERSION_BITMASK_WIDTH;
|
||||
/** List of the service's introduction points. Elements are removed if
|
||||
* introduction attempts fail. */
|
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smartlist_t *intro_nodes;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -2478,7 +2478,7 @@ connection_or_flush_from_first_active_circuit(or_connection_t *conn, int max,
|
|||
tor_assert(tmp == cell_ewma);
|
||||
add_cell_ewma_to_conn(conn, cell_ewma);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (circ != conn->active_circuits) {
|
||||
if (!ewma_enabled && circ != conn->active_circuits) {
|
||||
/* If this happens, the current circuit just got made inactive by
|
||||
* a call in connection_write_to_buf(). That's nothing to worry about:
|
||||
* circuit_make_inactive_on_conn() already advanced conn->active_circuits
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -4823,6 +4823,9 @@ rend_parse_v2_service_descriptor(rend_service_descriptor_t **parsed_out,
|
|||
10, 0, INT_MAX, &num_ok, NULL);
|
||||
if (!num_ok) /* It's a string; let's ignore it. */
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
if (version >= REND_PROTOCOL_VERSION_BITMASK_WIDTH)
|
||||
/* Avoid undefined left-shift behaviour. */
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
result->protocols |= 1 << version;
|
||||
}
|
||||
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(versions, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue