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Clarify a paragraph in prop 169.

This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2010-01-29 16:39:27 -05:00
parent e015fe8b09
commit f75f7322b9
1 changed files with 7 additions and 4 deletions
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11
doc/spec/proposals/169-eliminating-renegotiation.txt
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@ -314,10 +314,13 @@ Target: 0.2.2
cells.
* Send a NETINFO cell. Wait for a CERT and a NETINFO
cell from the server.
* If the CERT cell is a good cert signing the public
key in the x.509 certificate we got during the TLS
handshake, we connected to the server with that
identity key. Otherwise close the connection.
* If the CERT cell contains a valid self-identity cert,
and the identity key in the cert can be used to check
the signature on the x.509 certificate we got during
the TLS handshake, then we know we connected to the
server with that identity. If any of these checks
fail, or the identity key was not what we expected,
then we close the connection.
* Once the NETINFO cell arrives, continue as before.
And V3+ responder behavior now looks like this: