diff --git a/changes/bug24313 b/changes/bug24313
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b927ec3ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/bug24313
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+  o Major bugfixes (security, hidden service v2):
+    - Fix a use-after-free error that could crash v2 Tor hidden services
+      when it failed to open circuits while expiring introductions
+      points. Fixes bug 24313; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.  This
+      issue is also tracked as TROVE-2017-013 and CVE-2017-8823.
diff --git a/changes/trove-2017-009 b/changes/trove-2017-009
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..166a5faec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/trove-2017-009
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+  o Major bugfixes (security):
+    - When checking for replays in the INTRODUCE1 cell data for a (legacy)
+      hiddden service, correctly detect replays in the RSA-encrypted part of
+      the cell. We were previously checking for replays on the entire cell,
+      but those can be circumvented due to the malleability of Tor's legacy
+      hybrid encryption. This fix helps prevent a traffic confirmation
+      attack. Fixes bug 24244; bugfix on 0.2.4.1-alpha. This issue is also
+      tracked as TROVE-2017-009 and CVE-2017-8819.
+
+
diff --git a/changes/trove-2017-011 b/changes/trove-2017-011
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..82d20d9e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/trove-2017-011
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+  o Major bugfixes (security):
+    - Fix a denial of service bug where an attacker could use a malformed
+      directory object to cause a Tor instance to pause while OpenSSL would
+      try to read a passphrase from the terminal. (If the terminal was not
+      available, tor would continue running.)  Fixes bug 24246; bugfix on
+      every version of Tor.  Also tracked as TROVE-2017-011 and
+      CVE-2017-8821.  Found by OSS-Fuzz as testcase 6360145429790720.
+
diff --git a/changes/trove-2017-012-part1 b/changes/trove-2017-012-part1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9fccc2cf6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/trove-2017-012-part1
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+  o Major bugfixes (security, relay):
+    - When running as a relay, make sure that we never build a path through
+      ourselves, even in the case where we have somehow lost the version of
+      our descriptor appearing in the consensus. Fixes part of bug 21534;
+      bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha. This issue is also tracked as TROVE-2017-012
+      and CVE-2017-8822.
diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c
index f7bb8ff1f..2f7e053c8 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto.c
+++ b/src/common/crypto.c
@@ -666,11 +666,21 @@ MOCK_IMPL(int,
   return 0;
 }
 
+/** A PEM callback that always reports a failure to get a password */
+static int
+pem_no_password_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u)
+{
+  (void)buf;
+  (void)size;
+  (void)rwflag;
+  (void)u;
+  return 0;
+}
+
 /** Read a PEM-encoded private key from the <b>len</b>-byte string <b>s</b>
  * into <b>env</b>.  Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.  If len is -1,
  * the string is nul-terminated.
  */
-/* Used here, and used for testing. */
 int
 crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(crypto_pk_t *env,
                                        const char *s, ssize_t len)
@@ -689,7 +699,7 @@ crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(crypto_pk_t *env,
   if (env->key)
     RSA_free(env->key);
 
-  env->key = PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(b,NULL,NULL,NULL);
+  env->key = PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(b,NULL,pem_no_password_cb,NULL);
 
   BIO_free(b);
 
@@ -821,7 +831,7 @@ crypto_pk_read_public_key_from_string(crypto_pk_t *env, const char *src,
 
   if (env->key)
     RSA_free(env->key);
-  env->key = PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey(b, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+  env->key = PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey(b, NULL, pem_no_password_cb, NULL);
   BIO_free(b);
   if (!env->key) {
     crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "reading public key from string");
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c
index 0a5b5efd5..829a1b7ae 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.c
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.c
@@ -1469,6 +1469,7 @@ rend_service_receive_introduction(origin_circuit_t *circuit,
   time_t now = time(NULL);
   time_t elapsed;
   int replay;
+  size_t keylen;
 
   /* Do some initial validation and logging before we parse the cell */
   if (circuit->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO) {
@@ -1544,9 +1545,10 @@ rend_service_receive_introduction(origin_circuit_t *circuit,
   }
 
   /* check for replay of PK-encrypted portion. */
+  keylen = crypto_pk_keysize(intro_key);
   replay = replaycache_add_test_and_elapsed(
     intro_point->accepted_intro_rsa_parts,
-    parsed_req->ciphertext, parsed_req->ciphertext_len,
+    parsed_req->ciphertext, MIN(parsed_req->ciphertext_len, keylen),
     &elapsed);
 
   if (replay) {
@@ -3444,6 +3446,10 @@ remove_invalid_intro_points(rend_service_t *service,
       log_info(LD_REND, "Expiring %s as intro point for %s.",
                safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(intro->extend_info)),
                safe_str_client(service->service_id));
+      /* We might have put it in the retry list if so, undo. */
+      if (retry_nodes) {
+        smartlist_remove(retry_nodes, intro);
+      }
       smartlist_add(service->expiring_nodes, intro);
       SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(service->intro_nodes, intro);
       /* Intro point is expired, we need a new one thus don't consider it
diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c
index 64baf4d70..0c7c5e98f 100644
--- a/src/or/routerlist.c
+++ b/src/or/routerlist.c
@@ -2536,7 +2536,10 @@ router_choose_random_node(smartlist_t *excludedsmartlist,
       });
   }
 
-  if ((r = routerlist_find_my_routerinfo()))
+  /* If the node_t is not found we won't be to exclude ourself but we
+   * won't be able to pick ourself in router_choose_random_node() so
+   * this is fine to at least try with our routerinfo_t object. */
+  if ((r = router_get_my_routerinfo()))
     routerlist_add_node_and_family(excludednodes, r);
 
   router_add_running_nodes_to_smartlist(sl, allow_invalid,