62 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
62 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
# Overview
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Welcome to the Cwtch Secure Development Handbook! The purpose of this
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handbook is to provide a guide to the various components of the Cwtch
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ecosystem, to document the known risks and mitigations, and to enable
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discussion about improvements and updates to Cwtch secure development
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processes.
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## A (Brief) History of Metadata Resistant Chat
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In recent years, public awareness of the need and benefits of end-to-end
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encrypted solutions has increased with applications like [Signal](https://signalapp.org),
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[Whatsapp](https://whatsapp.com) and [Wire](https://wire.org) now providing
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users with secure communications.
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However, these tools require various levels of metadata exposure to function,
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and much of this metadata can be used to gain details about how and why a person
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is using a tool to communicate. [[rottermanner2015privacy]](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Peter_Kieseberg/publication/299984940_Privacy_and_data_protection_in_smartphone_messengers/links/5a1a9c29a6fdcc50adeb1335/Privacy-and-data-protection-in-smartphone-messengers.pdf).
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One tool that did seek to reduce metadata is [Ricochet](https://ricochet.im) first released in 2014.
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Ricochet used Tor v2 onion services to provide secure end-to-end encrypted communication,
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and to protect the metadata of communications.
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There were no centralized servers that assist in routing Ricochet
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conversations. No one other than the parties involved in a conversation could
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know that such a conversation is taking place.
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Ricochet wasn't without limitations; there was no multi-device support, nor is
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there a mechanism for supporting group communication or for a user to send
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messages while a contact is offline.
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This made adoption of Ricochet a difficult proposition; with even those in
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environments that would be served best by metadata resistance unaware that it
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exists [[ermoshina2017can]](www.academia.edu/download/53192589/ermoshina-12.pdf)
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[[renaud2014doesn]](https://eprints.gla.ac.uk/116203/1/116203.pdf).
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Additionally, any solution to decentralized, metadata resistant communication faces [fundamental problems](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/Fundamental-Problems)
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when it comes to efficiency, privacy and group security (as defined by [transcript consensus and consistency](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/Fundamental-Problems)).
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Modern alternatives to Ricochet include [Briar](https://briarproject.org), [Zbay](https://www.zbay.app/)
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and [Ricochet Refresh](https://www.ricochetrefresh.net/) - each tool seeks to optimize for a different
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set of trade-offs e.g. Briar seeks to allow people to communicate [even when underlying network infrastructure
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is down](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works/) while providing resistant to metadata surveillance.
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<hr/>
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The Cwtch project began in 2017 as an extension protocol for Ricochet providing group conversations via
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untrusted servers, with an eye to enabling decentralized, metadata resistant applications (like shared lists
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and bulletin board)
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An alpha version of Cwtch was [was launched in February 2019](https://openprivacy.ca/blog/2019/02/14/cwtch-alpha/), and
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since then the Cwtch team (run by the [Open Privacy Research Society](https://openprivacy.ca)) has conducted
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research and development into cwtch and the underlying protocols and libraries and problem spaces.
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