35 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
35 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
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In this section we will document simulations performed on the College Msg Core dataset (details below). In particular, we assess the worst-case scenario of a server with access to a sender-oracle (i.e. able to attribute tags to a
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particular sender) to understand how much information is leaked by fuzzytags without [appropriate deployment mitigations.](./deploying-fuzzytags.md)
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# College IM Dataset Simulations
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Nodes 1899
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Temporal Edges 59835
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Time span 193 days
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Pietro Panzarasa, Tore Opsahl, and Kathleen M. Carley. "Patterns and dynamics of users' behavior and interaction: Network analysis of an online community." Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 60.5 (2009): 911-932.
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## Scenario 1
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Setup: 20k events (7330 links). False positive rates: [0.007812, 0.5]. No entangling.
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Result: Server can identify ~4.3% of original graph (313 links) with a 12% false positive rate at threshold: 0.0001.
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## Scenario 2
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Setup: 20k events (7330 links). False positive rates: [0.007812, 0.5]. Every tag entangled to one random node (as before).
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Result: Server can identify ~3.95% of original graph (290 links) with a ~15% false positive rate.
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# Discussion
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A very similar result to our observations on the EU Core email dataset, entangled tags increase the false positive
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rate, although overall it requires non-naive entangling strategies to push the false positive rate of the derived graph
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to a place where it would not be useful for an adversary. |