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Spelling and clarity fixes

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Sarah Jamie Lewis 2021-01-31 13:59:34 -08:00
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6
ANONYMITY.md
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@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ The short answer is "it depends".
The longer answer: The longer answer:
When different parties have different false positive rates. The server can calculate the skew between a party's ideal When different parties have different false positive rates the server can calculate the skew between a party's ideal
false positive rate and observed false positive rate. false positive rate and observed false positive rate.
That skew leaks information, especially given certain message distributions. Specifically it leaks parties That skew leaks information, especially given certain message distributions. Specifically it leaks parties
who receive a larger proportion of system messages than their ideal false positive rate. who receive a larger proportion of system messages than their ideal false positive rate.
i.e. for low false positive rates and high message volume for a specific receiver, the adversarial server i.e. for low false positive rates and high message volume for a specific receiver, the adversarial server
can calculate a skew that leaks the receipient of individual messages - breaking privacy for that receiver. can calculate a skew that leaks the recipient of individual messages - breaking privacy for that receiver.
It *also* removes those messages from the pool of messages that an adversarial server needs to consider for other receivers. It *also* removes those messages from the pool of messages that an adversarial server needs to consider for other receivers.
Effectively reducing the anonymity set for everyone else. Effectively reducing the anonymity set for everyone else.
@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Under a certain threshold of parties, trivial breaks (i.e. tags that only match
Assuming we have large number of parties (_N_), the following heuristic emerges: Assuming we have large number of parties (_N_), the following heuristic emerges:
* Parties who only expect to receive a small number of messages can safely choose smaller false positive rates, up * Parties who only expect to receive a small number of messages can safely choose smaller false positive rates, up
to a threshold _θ_, where θ > 2^-N. The lower the value of _θ_ the greater the possibility of random trivial breaks for to a threshold _θ_, where _θ > 2^-N_. The lower the value of _θ_ the greater the possibility of random trivial breaks for
the party. the party.
* Parties who expect a large number of messages should choose to receive **all** messages for 2 reasons: * Parties who expect a large number of messages should choose to receive **all** messages for 2 reasons:
1) Even high false positive rates for power users result in information leaks to the server (due to the large 1) Even high false positive rates for power users result in information leaks to the server (due to the large

2
Cargo.toml
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
[package] [package]
name = "fuzzytags" name = "fuzzytags"
description = "a probabilistic cryptographic structure for metadata resistant tagging" description = "a probabilistic cryptographic structure for metadata resistant tagging"
version = "0.1.2" version = "0.1.3"
repository = "https://git.openprivacy.ca/openprivacy/fuzzytags" repository = "https://git.openprivacy.ca/openprivacy/fuzzytags"
authors = ["Sarah Jamie Lewis <sarah@openprivacy.ca>"] authors = ["Sarah Jamie Lewis <sarah@openprivacy.ca>"]
edition = "2018" edition = "2018"