Merge branch 'maint-0.3.2' into release-0.3.2

This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2018-05-24 09:40:06 -04:00
commit 432620e44e
3 changed files with 54 additions and 1 deletions

7
changes/bug26116 Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
o Minor bugfixes (compatibility, openssl):
- Work around a change in OpenSSL 1.1.1 where
return values that would previously indicate "no password" now
indicate an empty password. Without this workaround, Tor instances
running with OpenSSL 1.1.1 would accept descriptors that other Tor
instances would reject. Fixes bug 26116; bugfix on 0.2.5.16.

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@ -653,7 +653,12 @@ pem_no_password_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u)
(void)size; (void)size;
(void)rwflag; (void)rwflag;
(void)u; (void)u;
return 0; /* The openssl documentation says that a callback "must" return 0 if an
* error occurred. But during the 1.1.1 series (commit c82c3462267afdbbaa5
* they changed the interpretation so that 0 indicates an empty password and
* -1 indicates an error. We want to reject any encrypted PEM buffers, so we
* return -1. This will work on older OpenSSL versions and LibreSSL too. */
return -1;
} }
/** Read a PEM-encoded private key from the <b>len</b>-byte string <b>s</b> /** Read a PEM-encoded private key from the <b>len</b>-byte string <b>s</b>

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@ -1362,6 +1362,46 @@ test_crypto_pk_base64(void *arg)
tor_free(encoded); tor_free(encoded);
} }
static void
test_crypto_pk_pem_encrypted(void *arg)
{
crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL;
(void)arg;
pk = crypto_pk_new();
/* we need to make sure that we won't stall if somebody gives us a key
that's encrypted with a password. */
{
const char *s =
"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
"Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED\n"
"DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,EFA86BB9D2AB11E80B4E3DCD97782B16\n"
"\n"
"Z2Je4m0cFepc6coQkVbGcvNCHxTf941N2XYEVE6kn0CqWqoUH4tlwV6for5D91np\n"
"5NiEFTkWj31EhrvrYcuiJtQ/iEbABxZULFWFeJ058rb+1izBz5rScqnEacIS/3Go\n"
"YntnROBDwiKmUnue6PJVYg==\n"
"-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ,
crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(pk, s, strlen(s)));
}
/* For fun, make sure we aren't hit by OpenSSL issue
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/6347 , where we get in trouble
if a cipher doesn't use an IV.
*/
{
const char *s =
"-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
"Proc-Type:4,ENCRYPTED\n"
"DEK-Info:des-ede -\n"
"\n"
"iRqK\n"
"-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n";
tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ,
crypto_pk_read_public_key_from_string(pk, s, strlen(s)));
}
done:
crypto_pk_free(pk);
}
#ifdef HAVE_TRUNCATE #ifdef HAVE_TRUNCATE
#define do_truncate truncate #define do_truncate truncate
#else #else
@ -2990,6 +3030,7 @@ struct testcase_t crypto_tests[] = {
CRYPTO_LEGACY(pk), CRYPTO_LEGACY(pk),
{ "pk_fingerprints", test_crypto_pk_fingerprints, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, { "pk_fingerprints", test_crypto_pk_fingerprints, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
{ "pk_base64", test_crypto_pk_base64, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, { "pk_base64", test_crypto_pk_base64, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
{ "pk_pem_encrypted", test_crypto_pk_pem_encrypted, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
CRYPTO_LEGACY(digests), CRYPTO_LEGACY(digests),
{ "digest_names", test_crypto_digest_names, 0, NULL, NULL }, { "digest_names", test_crypto_digest_names, 0, NULL, NULL },
{ "sha3", test_crypto_sha3, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL}, { "sha3", test_crypto_sha3, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL},