20 lines
1.4 KiB
Markdown
20 lines
1.4 KiB
Markdown
# Cheating Proof Transcripts from the Swiss Post / Scytl Disclosure
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This repository contains proof transcripts that demonstrate flaws in the shuffle proof and decryption proof methods implemented in the
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SwissVote-Scytl evoting system.
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They were generated by Sarah Jamie Lewis, Olivier Pereira and Vanessa Teague, using techniques described in the following reports:
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* Lewis, Sarah Jamie, Olivier Pereira, and Vanessa Teague. "Ceci n’est pas une preuve." (2019). (https://people.eng.unimelb.edu.au/vjteague/UniversalVerifiabilitySwissPost.pdf)
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* Lewis, Sarah Jamie, Olivier Pereira, and Vanessa Teague. "How not to prove your election outcome: The use of nonadaptive zero knowledge proofs in the ScytlSwissPost Internet voting system." (2019).(https://people.eng.unimelb.edu.au/vjteague/HowNotToProveElectionOutcome.pdf)
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To verify these cheating proofs you will need [a copy of the Swiss Post / Scytl e-voting code base](https://git.openprivacy.ca/swiss-post-scytl-disclosure/sVote).
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## Additional Reading
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* Initial Disclosure: https://people.eng.unimelb.edu.au/vjteague/SwissVote.html
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* Lewis, Sarah Jamie, Olivier Pereira, and Vanessa Teague. "Addendum to how not to prove your election outcome: The use of nonadaptive zero knowledge proofs in the ScytlSwissPost Internet voting system, and its implications for cast as intended verification."(2019).https://people.eng.unimelb.edu.au/vjteague/HowNotToProveElectionOutcomeAddendum.pdf
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